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Portuguese, Greek CP Leaders on GOSR

Portuguese CP General Secretary

18000058 Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian
No 22, Nov 87 pp 75-77

[Article by Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general of the Portuguese Communist Party, on the occasion of the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution in response to invitation by the editors of PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text]The 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution was widely observed throughout the world. A great number of foreign delegations were present for the anniversary festivities in Moscow. A meeting of the representatives of parties and movements who came for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October was held.

The editors of the journal asked some of the foreign participants in the anniversary festivities in Moscow to share their thoughts and impressions.

Alvaro Cunhal, General Secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party: The Inspiring Strength of Revolutionary Ideas

Every anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which was carried out 70 years ago, during the October days of 1917, permits us to look more deeply into the past, to understand more clearly its historic significance and its enormous influence on the destiny of the world. In the speech which M. S. Gorbachev gave at the ceremonial session in the Kremlin Hall of Congresses and in the speeches of other participants, including foreign participants, the thought of the epochal significance of October and its ideas was the main thread.

This great date—7 November—by right entered the calendar of outstanding events in the 20th century. The entire world is celebrating the 70th anniversary of the revolution, when the working class, under the guidance of the party of Bolsheviks, took power into its hands in Russia.

The October Revolution had the deepest subsequent influence on the destiny of mankind, which not a single revolution had that preceded it. By that time, an attempt of the seizure of power by the working class had already taken place during the days of the Paris Commune. But, as is well known, it did not achieve success. The historic significance of the October Revolution consists in the fact that the people itself, the working class, won a complete victory over the exploiters.

If the Paris Commune proved that the proletariat in principle can take power into its hands, the Great October graphically demonstrated: The working class did not only actually achieve power, but could also

preserve it, defend its revolutionary achievements and build a new socialist society. Therefore, when we talk about the significance of the October Revolution, we emphasize both the importance of the accomplished revolutionary act itself and the necessity of studying more deeply the entire course of the revolutionary struggle, the seizure of power in the country, and the experience of the activity of the party of Bolsheviks, being directed by V. I. Lenin—a party which headed the revolutionary masses of the workers of Russia and led to the success of the cause of the revolution.

Today we talk also about the historic significance of the construction of socialism in the Soviet country, of all 70 years of the creation, under the guidance of the CPSU, of a new society. For us, the Portuguese communists, this has a special meaning. In celebrating the 70th anniversary of October, we see that the years that have passed after the revolution have been filled for the Soviet Union with the great creative work of the liberated people, which has truly become the master of the country and of life. In celebrating the red letter date of history—the anniversary of the October Revolution, we value very highly all the successes which the new socialist society has attained during the years of its life and struggle.

In making a general assessment, we understand that this creative process was not simple. In its course, there could be deviations, mistaken prognoses and decisions, which life did not support. It seems that the errors and deviations that took place are inevitable in such a complex and difficult process as is the construction of socialism. The Soviet communists have boldly and courageously recognized them and are eliminating them.

At the same time, I want to note this, on the global, general scale, the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union is an enormous achievement, a remarkable result of the Great October, which has truly international significance. And nothing can eclipse and belittle it. The October Revolution and the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union are epochal phenomena in the history of mankind.

It must be said that all subsequent development in the world was connected with October and developed under its influence. The October Revolution changed the entire course of development of society and mankind in our century and became the point of departure and moving force of a worldwide process, the beginning of a new epoch. This is now known to all. But this is not a popular phrase, but the reality itself. Because October has really opened a new epoch, the path to the construction of socialism. In the Soviet Union socialism has been built and its creation is continuing and its further development is proceeding.

Under the influence of the Great October, victorious new socialist revolutions took place in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Under its influence, peoples that had suffered from the colonial yoke rose up for the

struggle and gained independence. This led to the disintegration of the colonial system and the failure of the colonial policy of imperialism. Under the influence of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of October, the communist movement spread to all countries. In the world as a whole during the past years, many national and democratic revolutions have taken place in which, without a doubt, the influence of the October Revolution and the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union is felt.

Yet another aspect is important. This is the solidarity and support of the revolutionary and liberation movements in the world by the Soviet Union, support that is inspired by the principles of proletarian internationalism that is the point of departure of the CPSU, which enjoys international authority. For this reason I believe that the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October, that great historic date, includes many valuations of its enormous impact and influence.

During the days of the celebration of the anniversary of the Great October in Moscow, a great Meeting of the Representatives of the Parties and Movements of all Continents took place in Moscow. In and of itself, this Meeting is an eloquent acknowledgement of the realities characterizing this epoch and of the international influence of the October Revolution and the construction of the new society.

The world in which we live represents a complex network of class contradictions and processes of transformation and struggle interlacing with one another, but frequently also contradicting one another. However, international experience daily confirms the fact that it is not only necessary but also possible to find common goals and the prerequisites for joint actions and for solidarity among the forces of democracy, social progress, national independence and socialism. Today we face the urgent task of securing the survival of the human race itself, to defend the peace, and to conduct a struggle for the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe, the nuclear threat proceeding from imperialism. The defense of peace has now become a matter for all of humanity and for every person.

During the 70 post-October years, world development has confirmed the irreversible decline of capitalism, the failure of its militaristic, aggressive aspirations, and the advancement of the process of social transformations that are inseparable from October, from the building of socialism in the USSR and other countries, and from the influence and ideals of the communists.

At present, restructuring is under way in the Soviet Union and the renewal of all aspects of life is being implemented. I will tell you how people react to the restructuring in our country, in Portugal. Of course, the enemies of socialism, the anti-communists attempt to speculate about it, declaring that it is a "departure" of

the Soviet Union from the construction of socialism, that a "deviation" is taking place in the Soviet Union to positions of solving questions not in the spirit of socialism.

Some people even reach the point of saying that the restructuring per se is indicative of the the acknowledgement of the "failure" of the new order. This, so to speak, is the basic line of attack of the ideologists of anti-communism with respect to the restructuring that is being conducted in the USSR.

We, the Portuguese communists, understand the restructuring completely differently. What is the main thing in it? It is, above all, the acceleration of the socio-economic development of the Soviet country, the broader and more active use of the results of the scientific-technical revolution in the production process, and the intensification of the democratization of intra-party life and society itself. All of this, in our view, has as its final goal the further development of socialism and the increase of the material and cultural level of the life of the Soviet people, it enriches experience and perfects socialist society.

Perestroika is not a deviation, but a new step forward in the development of socialism. This means that the whole policy is in the service of the people, the broader participation of people is being secured not only in the execution, but also in the adoption of decisions in different conditions. For this reason, we, the Portuguese communists, follow with such attention and interest what is happening in the Soviet Union. Of course, as any other revolutionary process, the restructuring is encountering difficulties in its way, and most likely there will be difficulties in the future as well. But we see, and we have well recognized, this is emphasized also in the speech of M. S. Gorbachev dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Great October, that the restructuring is moving forward. The Soviet people is interested in this process and actively supports it.

Perestroika is the continuation of the cause of October according to its revolutionary ideals and spirit. Of course, the ideals of the October Revolution has always been alive in the Soviet Union, the thread has never broken. But I want to say in particular that the restructuring is proceeding precisely on the basis of the ideals of October.

The 70th anniversary of October is observed in Portugal and throughout the world with a belief in the future. In the ideas of October, the workers and peoples, as before, are drawing inspiration, incentives and strength for their struggle for a new future.

Greek CP General Secretary

Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 22, Nov 87 pp 77-78

[Article by Charilaos Florakis, secretary general of the Greek CP Central Committee, on the occasion of the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution in response to invitation by the editors of PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN]

[Text]

Charilaos Florakis General Secretary of the Greek CP Central Committee: The Historic Advantages of Socialism

The whole progressive world is observing the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which marked the beginning of a new era—the era of socialism and the downfall of capitalism. Non-transient is the influence of its ideas and cause on the development of the world. The October Revolution, carried out by the working class, the workers of Russia under the leadership of the Leninist party of communists, strengthened the hopes of the peoples for peace and freedom and gave new force to their struggle for social and national liberation. The world has changed beyond recognition during the past 70 years. The contribution of the Red October to the social and ideological progress of mankind is truly the greatest achievement of civilization.

Now, 70 years after the October Revolution, we see that its spirit has not become extinguished. The revolutionary transformations that are taking place in the USSR, which have received the designation of “restructuring”, “acceleration”, and “glasnost”, have become the modern expression of the ideals of October.

All this was convincingly revealed in the speech of M. S. Gorbachev dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Great October. I and the whole delegation of our party, having been present at the anniversary festivities in Moscow, listened to it with great attention and interest. The speech of comrade M. S. Gorbachev, “October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues,” represents a document, whose significance goes beyond the limits of one country. This speech gives a scientific assessment of the important periods of the development of socialism in the Soviet Union. This assessment enriches the experience of the international revolutionary movement and has special significance in light of the changes that are taking place in the Soviet Union today.

Moreover, the speech raised theoretical questions of enormous importance—questions related to present-day global problems, such as the problems of peace, disarmament and international security. Their comprehension in light of the new political thinking proposed by the USSR, without a doubt, leads to possibilities for the implementation, in practice, of the ideals of peace and the security of nations.

The Meeting of the Representatives of the Parties and Movements who came to the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October held in Moscow, and the representatives of the most diverse ideological currents standing for social progress took part in the Meeting, signifies, in our view, the recognition of the worldwide-historic significance of the October Revolution for the formation of the present-day world and for the great achievements of our epoch. It also seems to us that this Meeting is a stimulus for a more systematic exchange of opinions, for the setting up of a dialogue and cooperation between political forces which, with all the differences existing between them, are fighting for peace, democracy, national and social liberation.

I would like to emphasize: Precisely thanks to primarily the foreign policy activity of the Soviet Union, it proved possible to implement a number of important first steps on the road of the confirmation of the new political thinking about a single European house, about the common house of all the nations of our planet, steps in the continuing struggle for the strengthening of universal peace and disarmament. The policy of the USSR aimed at the liquidation of nuclear weapons and the improvement of the entire international situation cannot but call forth approval and support.

During the 70 years, a far from simple, but heroic path has been traversed by the Soviet country. The Soviet people solved the gigantic tasks of the reorganization of society on new socialist foundations and attained great progress in the socio-economic and other spheres. Today the CPSU is undertaking efforts to add still greater dynamism to the development of Soviet socialist society. Life graphically demonstrates the superiority of socialism over capitalism and its ability to overcome difficulties that arise and to make fuller use of the gigantic creative potential of the new social order.

We consider it our duty to express our gratitude to the Soviet people for its tireless struggle for peace and social progress, to reaffirm our international solidarity with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the great pioneer and prospector of the new paths.

Our party is fighting for the unity of the leftist and progressive forces of Greece, for changes from the orientations to socialism, for the departure from NATO and the EEC, for the conduct of an independent national policy outside of any blocs, for nuclear-free Balkans, and for the conversion of the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and peaceful cooperation. We come out on the side of the peoples fighting for peace, against the aggressive, militarist policy of imperialism and, above all, of the United States, and for our independence.

The Communist Party of Greece believes that the struggle for the creation of a system of universal security is not only a vital necessity for mankind, but also an integral part of the struggle for a change of society and for socialism. We fully acknowledge that in the nuclear

epoch the link of class demands and interests and demands and interests common to all mankind is deepening. Conscious class forces regard the task of the struggle for peace as a paramount one.

The ideas of October continue to exert their profound influence on the various aspects of the life of the peoples of the planet. If the Great October had not been 70 years ago and the historic revolutionary changes called forth by it, it would be difficult to imagine the face of the

present-day world. The Soviet Union and the other countries of socialism are strengthening the confidence of the progressive forces of the planet in the peaceful, happy future of all mankind.

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8970

**Czechoslovakia, USSR Move Toward Currency
Convertibility**

18250050 Moscow *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA* in
Russian No 12, Mar 88 p 20

[Article by TASS correspondent Yu. Trushin: "The First
Step Toward Convertibility"]

[Text] The inter-governmental agreement between the USSR and Czechoslovakia to use national currencies in computations in the area of direct ties, signed recently in Moscow, has evoked great interest among the Czechoslovak public. This is not surprising: at the beginning of 1988 over 230 Soviet and Czechoslovak collectives signed agreements establishing direct production and cooperative ties.

"I would like to point out at the very beginning that there are no analogues in the history of CEMA for the new Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement," Czechoslovak Minister of Finance Jaromir Zak emphasized in a conversation with TASS correspondent Yu. Trushin. "This will enable Czechoslovak and Soviet enterprises as well as the joint ventures and associations being set up to make mutual computations in national currencies. This does not require the enterprises to balance deliveries and purchases as was the case in the past. The balance will be

achieved at the inter-state level. The agreement guarantees organizations in both countries access to the national currency of the partner and means the introduction of domestic convertibility for a specific branch of industry or inter-branch ties. The rate of one ruble to 10.4 krona has been set for mutual payment for deliveries through direct ties.

"An instruction on implementing the interstate agreement on the convertibility of national currencies will be worked out by 1 April. All enterprises having agreements on direct ties will be able to make use of the agreement.

"In conclusion it must be noted that this finance measure adopted by the USSR and Czechoslovakia for the purpose of removing one of the main obstacles in the path of development of direct ties is also of interest to other CEMA member countries. Before the end of the current year we plan to sign a similar agreement with Bulgaria. Other socialist countries are displaying an interest in Czechoslovak-Soviet experience in this field".

The inclusion of national currency in international financial relations is being viewed as the first step toward gradual achievement of full convertibility of the national currency of socialist countries and a convertible ruble; this will create conditions for further improvement of the CEMA finance mechanism, the minister emphasized.

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USSR-Latin America Cooperation in World Problem-Solving Urged

18070055b Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* in Russian No 11, Nov 87 pp 5-6

[Editorial: "Mutual Attraction, a New Principle in World Development"]

[Text] The dialectics of the complex 20th century, unprecedented in its dynamism and historical significance, cannot be conceived without the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the stages of drastic change in recent times, whether during the years of the First or the Second World War, the October Revolution provided an alternative to the catastrophic turns of history. And today, when the course of world development has generated global problems and pointedly put the question of all mankind's survival on the agenda, the motherland of Great October was the first to point out the opportunities and means to rescue world civilization.

By freeing the vast human potential built into socialism in the course of restructuring, the Land of the Soviets has proved to be capable of looking in a new way at its responsibility for the fate of the planet and of proposing a constructive, specific and overall approach to the entire world to ensure that the conditions for mankind's progressive development in the nuclear and space age and the security of future generations are provided for. Reformative in nature but revolutionary in its global significance, this approach has absorbed mankind's hopes and aspirations and multiplied them by the outstanding achievements of world reason. So a concept of new political thinking—the creation of an all-embracing system of international security and progress for civilization—was brought forth. Daring and considered at the same time and devoid of hostility to the interests of different elements of the world community, it originates from the strength of collective action and the effectiveness of active participation by all countries, large or small and developed or developing, in building a new structure of peace on the earth, based on trust and cooperation.

All the foreign policy initiatives and international actions of the Soviet state undertaken in recent years and months have been permeated with this spirit, particularly the recent statements by M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the city of Murmansk, where far-reaching proposals were advanced to reduce confrontation and reinforce confidence and

development of cooperation in the economic and scientific fields, and to open up the Arctic Ocean and protect the environment in the northern part of the planet.

The recent visits by E. A. Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of foreign affairs, to Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay also were made in an atmosphere created by alternative political thinking which sweeps away the archaic stereotypes. It is noteworthy that these states, having discarded their traditional prejudices and hostility toward each other, have embarked on the path of mutual understanding and integration and are demonstrating their deep concern for the future of the South Atlantic and the Antarctic, which play an important role, just as the Arctic region does, in world politics and the maintenance of ecological equilibrium on our planet.

In the course of Comrade E. A. Shevardnadze's meeting with state officials of the three large Latin American countries, not only were long-term bilateral agreements concluded, but a coincidence of views and positions on key problems of the day was reached as never before. The focus of attention was primarily on problems related to the establishment of systems for universal political and economic security and disarmament in order to develop the "Third World" and overcome its backwardness and to eliminate the hotbeds of international tension in it, including in Central America, as rapidly as possible. Enriching the resolution of these problems with new ideas and proposals, the talks held by the USSR minister of foreign affairs in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay thoroughly examined the problem of improving international human relations. In this context, problems related to the need for collaboration to combat such dangerous social phenomena as drug addiction, as well as to eradicate the terrorism which now presents a serious threat to the world, were also examined.

Particular emphasis was given to the significance of the Antarctic Treaty and its supplementary agreements, which have made it possible for over two and a half decades to develop the world's first demilitarized and nuclear-free zone, an ecologically pure region unique in its way, and to realize the goals and principles of the UN Charter, and consequently, to open real opportunities to build a world that is nuclear-free, nonviolent, and ecologically safe.

Moreover, E. A. Shevardnadze's trip to Latin American countries demonstrated that the concept of new political thinking advanced by the USSR is receiving more and more international recognition and is becoming a force for the mutual attraction of components of the world community with different sociopolitical systems and for reforming the world. Great October is thereby continuing its historic creative activity, providing new substance for the era opened by the Russian Socialist Revolution of 1917.

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LA Institute Head, Former Mexican President Echeverria Meet

18070055c Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 87 pp 7-16

[Discussion between V. V. Volskiy, director of the Latin America Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and former Mexican President Luis Echeverria under the rubric "The New Era Begun by the October Revolution: Unforgettable Pages": "Revolutions and the Continuity of Times"; first four paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union and Mexico. Two countries which have their own history and two peoples which differ in character and temperament.

Nevertheless, they have something in common which brings them together. The roots of our mutual interest are very deep, but we really opened our hearts to each other when the earth was shaken first by the Mexican revolution and then the Great October Revolution—the most remarkable event of the 20th century.

The world has been living and changing under its profound influence for 70 years. It is no coincidence that Siqueiros and Rivera traveled to distant Russia and attended the October celebrations in Moscow to put their impressions of the new world on canvas.

So there were two revolutions. What makes them alike? How have they influenced the hearts and minds of people in the 20th century? A dialogue between Luis Echeverria, prominent political and public figure and former president of Mexico, and V. V. Volskiy, director of the Latin America Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was devoted to this.

V. Volskiy: Dear Luis Echeverria, it gives us, the Soviet Latin American specialists, great satisfaction to receive you. We are very pleased that you have visited our institute and the journal LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, which has published statements by you time and again. Today I would like to welcome you again as a representative of Mexico, a leading Latin American country which our people regard with friendship and affection.

We are living in a special time today: a time of our society's regeneration and mobilization of our social forces to breathe new life into the socialist system, in order to revitalize—once you yourself expressed it that way—to revitalize our social, economic and political life. Our people are also working at the same time to give the whole world an example of a constructive position in

international relations, positions of good will and justice, and to show the opportunities for new relations based on universal security, the elimination of nuclear weapons, and rejection of the prejudices which have existed in this area for such a long time and which are so difficult to overcome. All this is unquestionably necessary to create a new atmosphere in international relations, an atmosphere of calm and safe coexistence, in order to provide the peoples of the world with the opportunity to decide their own destiny in conformity with the right of self-determination.

L. Echeverria: It is entirely natural that we share your concern about the possibility of a new war. After all, our peoples are supporters of peace. I have always been convinced that socialism is based on a peaceful ideology and that the people of the Soviet Union are opposed to any war. But inasmuch as your revolution has been subject to attack since its first days and since they wanted to smother it even at birth, the struggle for survival and to protect the revolution's gains has become like a part of the Soviet Union's policy. I believe that the arms race also has forced your country to protect itself and to make new efforts, by allocating part of your resources to the country's defense and to maintain the vitality of your social and political system. But practically speaking, you have always struggled against the threat of war and against the arms race out of humanitarian convictions.

I think that both the Russian and Mexican revolutions have strived to change social conditions based on justice. Your revolution took shape under the conditions of the obsolete tsarist regime. This was a feudal society being swallowed up by the development of modern capitalism whose social contrasts were breaking the ancient country's humanitarian tradition. As I recall, there were certain tsars who were interested in the needs of their time and closely watched what was taking place in Europe, and tried to bring their country to the level of achievement of the leading European countries. Discontinuation of the process of modernization, stagnation and reaction became characteristic of prerevolutionary Russia. And your revolution was irrepressible, and began the struggle for equal rights in society. Owing to the new ideas shaped among the workers and in university circles in the last century, and thanks to the champions of justice who proclaimed and actively participated in the revolution, and Lenin first of all, a new doctrine emerged which pointed the way for the great people's movement whose 70th anniversary you are now observing.

V. Volskiy: I would like to add a few words with respect to this coincidence, which is not accidental, a coincidence not only in the time, but in the sources, scope and tension of the movement. This coincidence between the two countries has been noted beyond their borders as well. I am referring to impressions of the Russian and Mexican revolutions. For example, even John Reed, who had thoroughly and seriously studied the Mexican revolutionary movement and had written the book

"Insurgent Mexico," immediately traveled to Petrograd when our revolution began and recorded his impressions of it in the famous book "Ten Days that Shook the World." In this sense it seems very interesting, inasmuch as John Reed perceived the Great October Socialist Revolution as a continuation of the process of arousing the peoples, as an extension and expansion of what had been begun by the Mexican revolution. He made a comparison, saying that he had never seen, under any circumstances, enthusiasm by the masses on such a scale as in these two revolutions.

I will add that the Mexican revolution was welcomed enthusiastically in our country right after it began in 1910, though a great many different rumors were circulating, since the tsarist government was trying in every way possible not to allow extensive and reliable information on events in Mexico to appear in the newspapers. But it came through in spite of this. The Mexican revolution was mentioned in 1912 in connection with the Lena events, when the mass shooting of workers took place. Our people were inspired by the Mexican revolution at that time. In its turn, our revolution of 1905, the first Russian revolution, had repercussions throughout the world even though it was put down. And some information also reached Mexico, although it was certainly inadequate. I have several interesting documents from the Mexican National Library on the Russian revolution of 1905 at my disposal.

It appears that the earth has not only been transformed into a common home for peoples who seek justice now; it has become so small that we all consider ourselves neighbors. Even then it was impossible to do away with contacts among peoples. And it is very interesting to us that you were able to tell us about the impressions in Mexico of the Russian revolution of 1917. We know, for example, that Emiliano Zapata gave a high appraisal of our revolution in his letter to General (Amescua). What could you say in this regard?

L. Echeverria: If we are speaking specifically about how the revolutionary movement in Russia was perceived in Mexico, we must begin with the fact that we have known about the manifestations of social injustice as far back as the last century from translations of the great works of Russian literature, since it was precisely the great Russian literature of the last century, regardless of its features of outdated mysticism, which mentioned the contrasts and contradictions between the people and the aristocracy and the tyranny of tsarism. And in thinking about this artistic panorama now, I really believe that it played an extraordinarily important role for enlightened people in Mexico. Russian literature, trembling with the great social agitation, made a crucial contribution to development of the political and economic ideas which matured in the 19th century. To the great surprise of European political scientists, these ideas were the ferment for the new ideas and movements at the beginning of the 20th century which led to the revolution of 1905 and the Great October Revolution of 1917.

The view exists that the Mexican revolution was the first social revolution in this century. There is no question that there was great unrest in Russia in 1905, but it was suppressed. Only after that were the aims of the movement realized in the great social movement in 1917.

But even if the 1905 revolution in Russia had succeeded, I do not think the Mexican people would have begun to repeat the experiment. And not only because Mexicans were less informed about world events than the Russian people at that time. After all, having begun the revolution of 1917 after the culmination of the Mexican revolution, it followed its own path. Our revolutions were different, since they depended on specific circumstances, and I think that this is the most important thing in social development; otherwise, there is the danger that it would lapse into stock phrases whose artificial nature would doom the fighters to defeat. And at the same time, I say again that our revolutions have much in common because they are an expression of man's continuing struggle for justice, progress, and a better life for future generations. It seems to me that we should speak about this day after day, stressing the common things which unite people and give important meaning to their lives.

V. Volskiy: Everything you say is very true and brings us closer to the criteria for that social justice which you mentioned. And that is the reason that for me, for example, revolution should not and cannot end on some specific day, when everything has been done and we can live calmly, without revolutions.

I think this is an appeal to each of us, regardless of where we live, since there is always a place in life for great deeds, and there are tasks which must be carried out now at any costs and cannot be ignored.

In relating our revolutions with the problems of today, we can say that for us, the Soviet people, there are obviously two tasks of paramount importance. The first one is to provide for national security, to eliminate the threat of war and nuclear weapons throughout the world. The arms race has now reached such a level that the weapons accumulated are enough to destroy all life on earth 50 times over. This race can be spurred on too far. The transfer of nuclear weapons into space, the development of new types of mass destruction weapons, the removal of these weapons from man's direct and guaranteed control—all this is the sword of Damocles over our planet. And what is more, arms smuggling is being carried out on such a scale now that there is a danger that they may soon begin underground trading in nuclear weapons, for all I know.

In order to put an end to this, we must eliminate nuclear weapons. This is an indispensable condition. After all, it is madness that the greatest scientific achievement is capable of destroying all mankind. Our ruling communist party and the Soviet Government will not tire of

advancing new urgent peace initiatives to bring about a fundamental change in the international situation and to ensure lasting peace on earth. This is also our top-priority task.

The second task is domestic in nature: to restructure our society on the basis of universal peace in order to give it new acceleration and to demonstrate to the entire world that socialism can be a model of social development. It is precisely for this reason that we need new conditions capable of providing inspiration for the creation of something new and more persuasive, both in our country and the world as a whole. This is our vitally important task.

We are interested in learning how you regard the current situation with respect to the arms race and, on the other hand, how are the changes now under way in the USSR being perceived in Mexico?

L. Echeverria: New Soviet initiatives in the area of disarmament deserve the closest attention, inasmuch as the nuclear arms race has become extremely dangerous. Although everyone knows that there will be no winners in the event of a nuclear war. The entire world will suffer, even those countries which are far away from nuclear explosions. Not only the scientists but all peoples are aware of this. The danger is so great that it threatens all mankind, all civilization, and this is not simply a rhetorical statement. The struggle for disarmament is especially important today for this reason. We would only like to see that discussions about this are accompanied by practical deeds.

I cannot help but touch upon one problem in this connection. The relative passiveness of Third World countries in the struggle for peace and against the arms race is often mentioned. To a certain extent this is true: many developing states find themselves in such desperate economic straits that political priorities are displaced involuntarily. Incidentally, the industrially developed capitalist states, and mainly the United States, not only are spending gigantic sums on the arms race, but are also squeezing a significant part of them from Third World countries which have become stuck in hopeless debt. It is obvious that the fundamental change in international relations which the Soviet Government is trying to bring about should also include a change in relationships toward Third World countries; it should give them some confidence that disarmament will really promote development, and not that the status quo will be maintained in the world. It seems to me that it is necessary for the Soviet Government to take a more active part in the struggle for a new economic system. The current military expenditures which the Soviet Union has been compelled to undertake to the detriment of other areas of socialism's development are also very high, and this inevitably takes funds away from possible expansion of Soviet collaboration and assistance to Third World countries—this is a subject which would be worth studying in your institute.

V. Volskiy: You are right, of course.

L. Echeverria: The problem of foreign debt, which is considered a new form of colonial dependence, has been assessed in Soviet journals. A number of ways to resolve this problem have been suggested now. One of them—a proposal by nonaligned countries which raised this problem in the UN General Assembly—is the question of a new international economic system. I wish to say that arms production has become a very important sector of industry, since a large number of workers are employed in it and it forms a substantial part of international trade. Unfortunately, these circumstances will be a serious obstacle to the discontinuation of arms production, and nuclear arms production first of all.

Apart from this, it is very important not to forget about so-called conventional weapons. When the word "conventional" is heard in the world, it is interpreted as if it referred to something obsolete or of little danger. The vast arsenals of chemical and biological weapons remain untouched. Production of the weapons and trading in them, primarily their sale to Third World countries, are taking their normal course. All this presents a very depressing picture.

It is also worth while for you who are studying the problems of the Latin American continent to think about this, and there are quite enough materials in this connection.

Well, as far as restructuring is concerned, we can say unequivocally here that we view the processes now under way in the Soviet Union with interest and sympathy. Any system should be brought up to date, and it is natural for man to strive for perfection and to seek new ways. This process of rejuvenation is worthy of all kinds of research and encouragement. The combination of the advantages of centralized economic planning with the free critical initiative of labor collectives and individuals should yield very good results.

V. Volskiy: Now I suggest that we turn to the problems of Latin America, and Mexico in particular. What in your view are the problems of today which face the peoples of Latin America and Mexico? At our institute we see several trends in this connection, though we may be mistaken about something and we would like your competent opinion for this reason. It is apparent to us that very important events have been taking place recently, such as the move toward democracy in the southern part of Latin America, for example. On the other hand, we unfortunately see serious deterioration in the economic situation, not only caused by the past crisis, but chiefly in connection with the increased foreign debt of all countries, including the most developed ones, Mexico and Brazil.

L. Echeverria: A search for improvement in the political climate is now under way in Latin America, in my view. For many of our countries, the repressive regimes which

were maintained with foreign help have vanished into the past. This is not a uniform picture, but I am emphasizing only the most common trend, the search for democracy. But it does not exist if we are speaking about carrying it out in politics alone; it should be carried out in the social and economic areas as well. That is, this is a struggle which is part of the path being followed by Latin American countries. It was begun by our Liberators. I saw a fine portrait of Simon Bolivar when I entered the institute today, as if to welcome one who enters. The political and spiritual character of Simon Bolivar points the way to the future for us. He spoke of uniting the liberated Spanish colonies. He believed that the Spanish colonies could prevail and become stronger only by being united. So Bolivar's ideas continue to live and have an affect, although some people often neglect them in our Latin American part of the world. And there is no doubt that it is important for the institute to understand that the struggle for democracy in Latin America is not only in politics, but economics as well.

V. Volskiy: And it is important for LATINSKAYA AMERIKA readers to know your opinion on one more point. What do you think about the conflict in Central America? After all, there has been bloodshed there for such a long time now! What are the main causes of the conflict? What do you think about a political solution of it? What is your view of the Contadora process, inasmuch as Mexico has been at its source?

L. Echeverria: The Nicaraguan people's movement on the path of free democracy has not been understood by the United States. For many years the United States provided assistance to the Somoza tyranny, trampling on the interests of the Nicaraguan people, which led to a revolution and to the present conflict between West and East, since the Nicaraguans' aspirations correspond to the aspirations of the Cuban and Soviet peoples, and their sympathies with Nicaragua coincide with the sympathies of the majority of Latin American countries, including Mexico. The Mexican Government believes that the Nicaraguan problem, and the conflict in Central America as a whole, naturally, can be resolved only by political, democratic means.

V. Volskiy: And the final question, although it may not be the last in importance. How do you assess the prospects for relations between Mexico and the USSR and between the Soviet Union and Latin America? We welcomed with great interest the invitations given to M. S. Gorbachev by certain presidents of Latin American countries to visit their states. This is particularly interesting, because it seems to me that we underestimated Latin America's role in the world to a certain extent previously. The foreign policy of the USSR has been devoted basically to problems involving the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. We Latin American specialists are very pleased with the recognition of the importance of Latin America's role in our foreign policy. We are confident that there are considerable opportunities and mutual interest in expanding and

reinforcing our relations. And this relates not only to economic ties, but relations in the areas of culture and science and the joint struggle in the United Nations to implement the principles of justice which you mentioned.

L. Echeverria: I think that the possibility of a visit by Gorbachev to certain countries in Latin America is arousing much interest in the region, and he will be received very warmly. Recently Mexico's secretary of foreign relations, Doctor Sepulveda, visited the Soviet Union. His visit here was widely reported by the mass media, and this was noted with satisfaction in Mexico. All this may be considered as a prelude to Gorbachev's visit to our country. The Soviet Union's struggle for peace is viewed with interest in Latin America. It will contribute to an extension of the growing good relations. Trade and cultural exchange should also be expanded. I would like the Soviet people's struggle to improve their life to be studied more seriously in Latin America. I would like the Soviet Union to understand the Latin American peoples' aspirations for freedom, independence, and social improvements and to have the USSR's relations with each Latin American country built on mutual respect.

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Left-Radical Parties' Role in LA Liberation Movement Viewed

18070055d Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* in Russian No 11, Nov 87 pp 49-56

[Article by B. M. Merin: "The Dynamics of Social Changes and Leftist Forces"]

[Text] It was noted in the CPSU Central Committee report to the 27th CPSU Congress that "the liberation revolutions begun by Great October are determining the character of the 20th century. No matter how significant the achievements of science and technology and the effect on society of rapid scientific and technical progress, only man's social and spiritual emancipation make him really free. And no matter what obstacles on this path—objective and artificial—are put in the way by the old world, the course of history is inevitable."¹

The deep structural crisis of the system of capitalism in the region continuously intensifies the struggle for alternative ways of further development in Latin American countries. The emergence in the 1970's of regimes of progressive, anti-imperialist orientation in a number of countries which embarked on the path of carrying out comprehensive socioeconomic reforms (Chile, Peru, Panama, and so forth) and the establishment of democratic regimes in the 1980's in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and other countries attest to the vast potential strength of the peoples of Latin America and the working

class, first of all. The working class, the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress state, has been and continues to be "the basic revolutionary class of the modern era." "In the world of capital it is the principal force struggling for the overthrow of the system being exploited and the building of a new society."² The proletariat of Latin America and its militant vanguard, the communist parties, are the most important motive force of the revolutionary movement in the region. Over the past 20 years, the size of the working class has increased here by 1.5 times as much; by the 1908's, there were about 45 million persons in its ranks.

The principal trend in changes in the structure of the urban proletariat is the increase in the role of industrial workers. In the most developed countries (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay), the proportion of factory and plant workers employed in enterprises of the processing industry has increased. At the same time, new detachments of workers are increasing in the modern sectors of metallurgical, oil refining, petrochemical, electric power, and automotive production. The proletariat of the 1980's is more differentiated and diversified than the generations of its predecessors. Extension of the social limits of the proletariat, the involvement in it of intermediate strata employed in the nonmaterial area, the surmounting of old social and cultural boundaries, and the accumulation of experience in struggle—all these are prerequisites for the increase and further growth of the working class in Latin American society.

A substantial proportion of the workers are in the agricultural proletariat; at the start of the 1980's, there were 13 to 14 million of them, or one-third of the rural hired workers. Revolutionary forces in various countries in the region are establishing contact through the leading organizations of rural hired workers with the broad strata of the peasantry—the natural ally of the working class in the struggle to implement comprehensive socioeconomic and political reforms. The Latin American peasantry continues to be an important social force. It is taking an active part in the class struggle in countries such as Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia.

The all-embracing system of capitalist exploitation is leading to the point that other strata of the population and many groups of small owners, employees, the intelligentsia, and students are drawing closer to the working class and becoming its allies. The middle urban strata (small employers in industry and the services area, a considerable number of employees, and bureaucrats, the intelligentsia, and students)—the intermediate strata between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—are an important and constant component in the class structure of Latin American society.

The development of GMK [state monopoly capitalism] has contributed to the significant social differentiation within all categories of the middle urban strata: the

process of their proletarianization is becoming intensified. It is precisely the alliance of these social forces headed by the proletariat which also constitutes the objective foundation for the anti-imperialist liberation struggle in Latin America in the current stage.

However, the bloc of progressive forces has to function under more complicated conditions when the ruling classes and their foreign ally—the TNK [trans-national corporations]—have reinforced their positions significantly in the economic and political fields. By making modernization of the existing structures as a panacea to get rid of social revolutions the basis of their strategy, the ruling classes and foreign monopolies have approved various alternate forms of exercising control. The course of history has graphically demonstrated that fascist and authoritarian regimes have proved to be ineffective and have not been able to rely on any kind of significant social base. By having assistance from reactionary circles in the United States and part of the local conservative circles at their disposal, they have been kept in power with the aid of mass terror. But it has become more and more difficult to do this where the contradictions are more acute. The structural crisis in the deformed development of capitalism has become apparent in more and more destructive forms. The debt, which has reached astronomical figures, has practically paralyzed economic activity in Latin American countries. Under these conditions, the struggle over ways for countries in the region to extricate themselves from the structural crisis has been sharply intensified. In the current stage, the inseparable link between the anti-imperialist movement and the social and class struggle is becoming more and more obvious. The contradiction between labor and capital is playing a more and more important role in determining the socialist prospects for revolutionary processes in the region.

According to calculations by progressive Latin American economists, the proletariat's standard of living in the late 1970's and early 1980's fell to a half or a third of what it was. Mass unemployment became the lot of many millions of workers. It suffices to say that the number of persons in the working class dropped by 600,000 during the dictatorship in Argentina. In Central America, unemployment among agricultural workers—the basic detachment of the proletariat in this subregion—reached 44 percent. The process of destitution affected not only the workers, but middle urban strata as well.

The pressure in the "social boiler" has become so high that the ruling classes in Latin America and U. S. imperialism have had to dismantle the pro-fascist, authoritarian regimes. However, the replacement of military dictatorship regimes in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay with governments of "representative democracy" took place by reinforcing capitalism and weakening the positions of leftist forces. The paradox is that the basic force which crippled these regimes was the working class and its allies, but the fruits of victory went to a bloc of the same classes as in the previous regimes. From the

viewpoint of the United States, the new regimes can maintain class rule at less expense, reinforce capitalism as a system, modernize the existing structures, and bind Latin America even more closely to the world capitalist economy. In El Salvador, the Reagan administration even took upon itself the initiative of replacing an ultrareactionary regime with the government of a Christian Democrat. The purpose of this maneuver was to weaken the Salvadoran people's struggle against the pro-American tyranny. It cannot be said that the U. S. administration suffered a complete fiasco on this path. The Duarte government has been able to establish a definite social base for its regime by maintaining the fruits of a number of reforms carried out under Colonel Mojano and by making certain reforms in the interest of the middle urban strata. Without a vast amount of aid from the Reagan administration, it is unlikely that Duarte would have succeeded in carrying out these plans.

The United States is also taking similar steps in Chile, where they are trying to prevent leftist forces from coming to power. The Pinochet regime, which is completely isolated politically, can only exist because it receives overall support from the United States. This by no means indicates that the White House would not like to change its masks, but taking into account that there is a strong democratic opposition in Chile, it fears that the leftist forces may acquire such political influence that the White House cannot fix it in any way. Hence the Reagan administration's strategy: first disunite and weaken the leftist forces and isolate them, then shift the power to the moderate bourgeois opposition. To a certain extent, this also explains the "tenacity" of the Pinochet regime, which has been forced to rely on a repressive system because it has no kind of significant social base.

The true objectives of U. S. imperialism in Latin America can be traced most clearly in Central America, which is the focus of hostility between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary alternatives of development. It is perhaps unlikely that we can find a case in Latin America where the set of methods used by U. S. imperialism against Sandinist Nicaragua is similar: from crude military pressure and the desire to repeat the Grenada alternative to the tactic of "anti-insurgency reformism" and "change and evolution of the Sandinist regime" in the direction of bourgeois reformism. But the point is the same: to deprive the people of Nicaragua of the right to implement the choice they made—to establish an independent, democratic, sovereign state.

Naturally, not only domestic and foreign reaction, but the revolutionary forces as well, are learning lessons from the events in Nicaragua. The building of a new life in Nicaragua has demonstrated the importance for the revolution of both international solidarity and the correct solution of socioeconomic and political problems and the unity of leftist forces, which is especially crucial in the current stage of the liberation movement. Those strata of the population which remained apart from the

main path of development of the liberation movement in the region, including patriotic, anti-imperialist military, and progressive church circles, are being drawn more and more actively into the struggle against domestic and foreign reaction. All this increases the potential might of the liberation movement and opens new prospects for extending its aims and objectives. The aspiration to achieve unity based on the formation of democratic, anti-imperialist fronts, blocs and coalitions, which is gaining strength among practically all progressive forces, attests to these opportunities.

Leftist forces have made certain progress in the struggle to achieve and organize unity in a number of countries in the region (in El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Uruguay). The problem of unity continues to be unresolved in the majority of Latin American countries. The increase in the number of social strata in the liberation movement engenders such negative manifestations as increased influence on its separate detachments by the concepts of petty bourgeois revolutionism and leftism, which stimulate anticommunist attitudes. The problems of trade union and political organization in the working class and other strata of workers who retain national-reformist illusions in their ranks complicate the formation of anti-imperialist unity among the people.

At the same time, the inclusion of new social strata and political trends in the anti-imperialist liberation processes and the unification of many of them into coalitions and blocs in which the proletariat and militant trade unions play a very important role create more favorable conditions than before to reinforce the influence of progressive proletarian ideology on the revolutionary movement. Amidst the growing polarization of forces in Latin America, the question of the leading role of the working class and its capability of heading the revolutionary liberation movement of the masses in the region arises as never before. Events in the 1980's attest to the fact that the workers movement has been transformed into an influential political organizing force throughout Latin America and into the most important factor contributing to the radicalization and extension in the role played by representatives of modern sectors of industry, chiefly those employed in transnational enterprises; and stronger solidarity among the various strata of workers are being observed everywhere. The process of politicization in the trade union movement and an increase in trends to reinforce the unity of trade unions on a class basis are being observed. The struggle of the working class is characterized in many cases by a combination of specific class demands with increased in the role played by representatives of modern sectors of industry, chiefly those employed in transnational enterprises; and stronger solidarity among the various strata of workers are being observed everywhere. The process of politicization in the trade union movement and an increase in trends to reinforce the unity of trade unions on a class basis are being observed. The

struggle of the working class is characterized in many cases by a combination of specific class demands with the demands of a general democratic and anti-imperialist nature.

But these favorable objective conditions for unifying leftist forces are far from being adequately utilized in accordance with the opportunities which exist. First of all, there is practically no unquestionable political leader—an organization which could cement this unity—in the bloc of leftist forces in most Latin American countries. Secondly, this is explained by the reluctance of radical leftist parties and revolutionary democrats to share leadership with other political organizations, although the positions of parties in the leftist spectrum coincide or are close on most of the important questions of strategy and tactics. Especially since all the experience in past decades attests to the evolution of these parties and organizations toward scientific socialism. Thirdly, it is necessary to take the level of sociopolitical and economic development of Latin American countries into consideration. The development of tactics which would be suitable for all countries in Latin America often leads to centrifugal trends among the leftist forces.

The advance of a qualitatively new stage in further development of the liberation struggle in countries of the region depends on a number of objective and subjective factors. Realities have emerged in our time which require further development of the theory and practice of struggle by revolutionary forces: the change in the nature of the struggle for peace in the face of the nuclear threat of imperialism and the emergence of global problems.

As pointed out in the meeting to discuss certain pressing problems in the modern communist movement held in Prague in 1986, the combination in practice of various aspects of the historical mission of the working class "is a complicated matter which entails a great many specific problems, but such a combination is a historical necessity."³ Under the conditions of globalization of sociopolitical processes, V. I. Lenin's words that "the interests of social development are greater than the interests of the proletariat" are particularly timely.⁴

We can fully agree with Yu. Krasin's thesis that "the practical coordination of communists' antiwar activity with the struggle for social and class objectives is also of no small importance... For this, the social base of communists should be imbued with an awareness of the inseparability of the struggle for peace and for the revolutionary transformation of society. This awareness can reach the masses of the working class only through their own experience. But this experience itself is also contradictory. In certain Latin American countries, for example, the specific living conditions of some of the workers are such that the threat of a nuclear whirlwind is perceived by them as something remote, while the threat of death from starvation is something completely tangible that already exists... This is a contradiction of reality itself."⁵

This does not refer to a denial of the class struggle in an antagonistic society, but to the forms of class struggle under the conditions of nuclear and space realities, when the very existence of mankind and civilization is threatened, and to the comparability of the class struggle and the problem of mankind's survival. The communist parties of Latin America understand the need for creative comprehension of the situation which has taken shape in countries of the region and for correlation of national and regional problems with global ones. The process of restructuring which has begun in many communist parties in Latin America is not taking place without difficulties. The emergence of a number of new problems in the current stage of the anti-imperialist liberation movement has evoked pointed discussions among revolutionary forces. The problems of the cost of revolution, the large numbers in the vanguard and the strategic and tactical allies in different stages of the revolution, and so forth are given top-priority attention by the communist parties, which are striving to comprehend the overall and specific characteristics of the liberation process in the region.

The communist parties' responsibility for selecting the forms of struggle is increasing immeasurably. This does not refer to a rejection of armed struggle. But in a region where all the many ultraleftist and leftist extremist organizations have advocated and are advocating only one form of struggle—armed struggle, “force can easily be transformed from the ‘midwife’ of history into its ‘gravedigger.’ Social births may prove to be social death.”⁶

Under present conditions, “any local conflict has the tendency of growing into a regional or even a world conflict. The nuclear age requires the utmost consideration from revolutionary forces in making decisions on armed struggle and repudiation based on principle of the various manifestations of leftist extremism. On the other hand, this age has by no means removed the necessity of giving a decisive rebuff to reaction and counterrevolution where they attempt to do away with the democratic and socialist gains of the people by force and to turn back historic progress.”⁷

Overcoming the sectarian approach to selection of the forms of struggle and measuring it against the global problems of mankind's survival—these are problems which are being faced today by the progressive forces of the region. Resolving these problems in Latin America is quite complicated, since the majority of ultraleftist organizations refuse to take the realities of the nuclear age into account. But under present conditions, conducting a struggle to establish broad anti-imperialist coalitions and alliances and a struggle to unify the leftist forces without combining it with the struggle against the threat of nuclear war and for disarmament means emasculating class and human values. Only the parties and organizations which exert influence on the masses and are equipped with the concepts of scientific socialism can unite all the progressive forces and give them the correct

guideposts to achieve common human and class ideals. Many communist parties in Latin America are seeking ways and means to reinforce their organizations and extend their influence to the working class and other workers strata and to turn into parties of the masses.

The restructuring begun in the Soviet Union is exerting a positive influence on the processes under way in Latin America. The 27th CPSU Congress has developed the concepts and traditions of Great October creatively. Acceleration of social and economic development and the democratism and glasnost of Soviet society make socialism even more attractive, help to reinforce the positions of those who advocate a noncapitalist alternative, increase the authority and influence of communist parties and narrow the sphere of influence of anticommunist ideas and propaganda, and promote greater mutual understanding among the various movements struggling for peace and social progress.

Footnotes

1. “Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza” [Materials on the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 7.
2. Ibid., p 133.
3. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOSTSIALIZMA, No 10, 1986, p 40.
4. V. I. Lenin, “Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy” [Complete Works], Vol 4, p 220.
5. RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR, No 2, 1987, p 56.
6. PRAVDA, 14 Nov 1986.
7. Ibid.

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Provisions of Nicaragua's New Constitution Described

18070055e Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 87 pp 57-62

[Article by A. P. Strogov and A. A. Klishin: “Democracy, the Basic Law of the Sandinist Revolution”]

[Text] The National Constituent Assembly of Nicaragua promulgated the country's new constitution on 9 January 1987. This event was the culmination of 2 years of preparatory work by the National Constituent Assembly and all the country's public and mass organizations. The

Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua became the most important step in the legislative consolidation of the gains of the Sandinist revolution.

Nicaragua has had 12 previous constitutions in its post-colonial period, four of which were not put into effect. The first constitution, adopted in 1838, legislatively established the rule of the propertied classes, chiefly the landowners. Persons over age 20 who owned property were recognized as citizens of the country. Later on, the adoption of new constitutions was linked with the struggle between liberals and conservatives and other ruling groups, and changes were related basically to the separation of legislative and executive powers.

After the Somoza dynasty seized power, a constitution was adopted in 1939 which promoted the enrichment of the dictator's clan, suppressed opponents of the regime, and so forth. In 1962, under pressure from J. Kennedy's administration, which was concerned by the victory of the Cuban revolution, an amendment to the constitution was introduced on the necessity of electing a civilian president, a figure who could protect the facade for pro-American tyranny.

The pro-Somoza constitution was repealed on the second day after the victory of the Sandinist revolution. Considerable legislative experience has been accumulated by the country since that time. It may be stated without exaggeration that the constitution of free Nicaragua rests on a stable normative base in which such formal documents as the law on creation of the Sandinist army, on appeal against officials' actions which infringe upon citizens' rights and freedoms, on agrarian reform, on citizenship, and the electoral law stand out.

The special constitutional commission of the National Constituent Assembly began its work on 21 March 1985 in three directions: a subcommittee on constitutional affairs drafted the basic law, taking into consideration the views of the 24 political parties and organizations which submitted their reports, and a subcommittee for national consultation was responsible for conducting seminars, television debates, and meetings and the discussion of drafts of the constitution in open assemblies. The third subcommittee, which was concerned with foreign relations, organized visits by National Constituent Assembly delegations to the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Spain, France, Great Britain, and other countries to study their constitutions. After 11 months of intensive work, the constitutional commission submitted a draft of the basic law of Nicaragua, which was supported by all parties represented in the National Assembly except for the Independent Liberal Party, which left the constitutional commission, for national discussion.

Official views on the constitution draft were expressed by the Conference of Bishops of Nicaragua, the Protestant religious organizations, parties not participating in the National Assembly, and the Superior Council of

Private Enterprise, as well as the representatives of various social and professional groups. Discussion of the draft of Nicaragua's new constitution was therefore truly national in character. The range of suggestions proved to be exceptionally broad: the rightist and right centrist parties insisted on adoption of the classic bourgeois constitution, which would sanction the "sacred right" of private property without limitations. The Democratic Conservative Party's proposals, for example, included a clause on limiting military expenditures to 10 percent of the state budget and limiting mobilization for military service to no more than 10 percent of the country's male population between ages 24 and 34. Adoption of such a "proposal" during a war against the contras would be a serious threat to the country's defense capability. On the other hand, the "Popular Action Movement—Marxist-Leninist" branded the draft as one which is bourgeois-liberal and maintains the freedom to exploit the working class.

Important changes were introduced in the text of the constitution in the course of the national discussion: the structure of the basic law was modified, certain sections were expanded and others were removed, and wording was made more precise. The question arises, however: to what extent does the new Nicaraguan constitution correspond to political and socioeconomic realities in the country and to what extent is it programmed and strategic in nature? It is no secret that constitutions adopted during periods of turbulent revolutionary processes often anticipate and get ahead of events which really are moving in a different direction and which differ in nature. At the same time, the programmed significance of any constitution cannot be ruled out. Moreover, it would not be correct to deny that the norms of a constitution should correspond to the conditions which have really taken shape in order to regulate public relationships effectively and promote the progress of the new social system. Only the balance of the two factors cited ensures the effectiveness of the basic law within the framework of a historically meaningful period.

On the whole, it may be stated that the new Nicaraguan constitution takes into account the complex, contradictory conditions of the current stage in the country's development. Article 1 of the constitution declares independence, sovereignty and national self-determination as the central principle in the republic's international position. National sovereignty is held by the people (Article 2), whose power is exercised both directly by themselves and through their representatives, who are freely elected by secret ballot by all strata of the population through universal, equal, and direct elections. The organization charged with expressing and protecting the interests of the Nicaraguan people is the state (Article 4). The basic law stresses the new nature of the state under revolutionary reform conditions. The broad strata of the population become its social basis, and the basic efforts of the state machinery are directed at providing for political pluralism in the country, the development of a mixed economy, and adherence to the principles of the nonaligned movement (Article 5).

The concept of political pluralism is worthy of particular attention. It is expressed conceptually in Article 5 and affirms the right of "all political organizations to take part in resolving the country's economic, political and social problems without infringement of this right for ideological motives..." A policy of consensus has been followed by the leadership of the Sandinist revolution since the first days of its existence. At the same time, political pluralism is only a constitutional form; its content depends on many factors of objective and subjective order which inevitably give rise to new contradictions. Under these conditions, the further development of political principles in organizing the Nicaraguan society assumes even greater importance.

Matters related to the economic system are reflected in several parts of the constitution. A mixed economy, which provides for the coexistence and interaction of different forms of property—state property and private property, the property of associations, and cooperative and communal property—was proclaimed as one of the fundamental principles. Mixed state and private property, which is quite extensive in the processing industry, and the property of foreign capital which remains in Nicaragua are not singled out particularly in the constitution.

Features of the Nicaraguan conception of a "mixed economy" are set forth in Article 99, which states that "the state directs and plans the national economy to provide for the interests of the majority of the population." Banking and insurance business and foreign trade were declared to be exclusive areas of state activity along with its leading role in the economy.

A special section is devoted to agrarian reform, which is considered the basic instrument for fair distribution of the land and a strategic means for revolutionary reforms, national development, and social progress Article 106). Agrarian reform is aimed at eliminating the large landed estates and inefficient production. At the same time, the constitution guarantees ownership of land without establishing limits on the size of the property Article 108) to all those who cultivate it productively and efficiently. The provision cited emphasizes the flexible nature of agrarian reform in Nicaragua, which combines the principles of social justice and productive land use. The state encourages voluntary unification of peasants in cooperatives, providing them with resources, and it provides incentive for small and medium-size agricultural producers to become part of the plans for economic and social development of the country collectively and individually.

The "separation of powers" concept has been affirmed in Nicaragua's constitution. Article 7 establishes the subdivision into legislative, executive, judicial, and electoral powers in the country.

The supreme organ of legislative power in Nicaragua is the National Assembly, which consists of 90 deputies (the minimum number) who are chosen by secret ballot in universal, direct and free elections for local districts in accordance with the principle of equal representation (Articles 132 and 133). Nicaragua has a multiparty parliament. Elected for a 6-year term, it drafts and adopts laws and decrees, makes changes in the normative documents in force, and interprets statutes; it approves the country's state budget; it approves and abrogates international agreements; and it delegates legislative functions to the country's president in the procedure stipulated by law ((Articles 136 and 137). This is the strictly legislative activity of Nicaragua's highest representative body. At the same time, it also has the right to carry out activities which go beyond legislative work, in the precise sense of this term. This involves those functions of the National Assembly which are related to checking the performance of duties by high state officials and the managers of economic units in the public sector, and to the establishment of permanent commissions whose duties include various supervisory functions, and so forth (Article 138).

All this makes it possible to draw a conclusion on the conventionality of the separation of powers in Nicaragua set forth by the constitution. Let us note that doubts were expressed concerning the concept of "legislative power," in particular, in the course of discussion on the new constitution. It was suggested that the term "supreme constitutional power" be used to reflect the diversity of functions performed by the country's National Assembly. This proposal was not approved as the standard, however, and this is logical, since the first and second concepts are equally conventional and there is no sense in making changes in the conceptual system which took shape in the process of constitutional development.

All executive power in Nicaragua belongs to the president of the republic, who is also the chief of state, chairman of the government, and supreme military commander of the armed forces and security (Article 144). The head of executive power in Nicaragua is elected for a 6-year period by secret ballot in universal, equal, free, appoints and dismisses ministers; and directs all social and economic policy within the country (Articles 150 and 151). This is explained in part by the objective requirement to consolidate administration of the country under the conditions created by the military situation and the complex socioeconomic conditions. It is worth noting, however, that a situation such as this (the domestic political situation as well as the international situation) cannot be considered normal; it should appoints and dismisses ministers; and directs all social and economic policy within the country (Articles 150 and 151). This is explained in part by the objective requirement to consolidate administration of the country under the conditions created by the military situation and the complex socioeconomic conditions. It is worth noting, however, that a situation such as this (the domestic political situation as well as the international situation)

cannot be considered normal; it should be considered rather as temporary, transitional, and to a certain extent extraordinary. For this reason, the wording of the basic law, which as mentioned is programmed in nature, should not be completely oriented toward this situation, but it should be called upon to reflect certain strategic concepts. The concept of democratization of the system of state administration, within the framework of which the role of representative organs of power would be increased at the expense of the competence of one state institution or another, became one of them, it seems.

The country's highest judicial power is represented by the Supreme Court, which is the final link in the unified judicial system which includes local courts of different levels (Articles 158 and 159). Members of the republic's Supreme Court are elected by the National Assembly for a 6-year term (Articles 162 and 163). Like the judges in local judicial organs, they are independent in their activity, subordinate only to the law, and guided by the principles of equality, openness, and the right to a defense. Article 165 notes that court proceedings are free of charge.

In speaking of the judicial system, we cannot help but dwell on the mechanism of constitutional review, the responsibility for which is entrusted by the basic law to the Supreme Court (Paragraph 4, Article 164). Opinions were expressed opposing introduction of the institution of constitutional review, which supposedly can make decisions by the supreme legislative organ dependent on the discretion of members of the Supreme Court. It was pointed out, moreover, that under the conditions of political pluralism the levers of constitutional review may be utilized by certain political forces to obstruct the democratic process. It appears that such arguments are not persuasive, however. The absence of control over legislative activity may present an even greater danger, especially since the constitution shifts a significant part of it to the executive power.

The Nicaraguan constitution also regulates the electoral power. Electoral organs organized in a unified system are headed by the Supreme Electoral Council, which is charged with the preparation and conduct of all forms of elections, referendums and plebiscites (Articles 168 and 170). It must be kept in mind, of course, that the term "power" as applied to the electoral system is used in a conditional way to a significant extent, since electoral organs, including the Supreme Council, do not possess plenary powers, judging by the text of the Basic Law (See Article 173). And this is understandable; after all, otherwise they would be duplicating the activity of the state institutions which possess the real legislative or executive power. At the same time, the isolation of electoral organs in a separate hierarchical system based on the principle of subordination to the center is interesting from an organizational point of view.

The rights of individuals and groups are given an important place in the constitution. They are divided into political, social, family and labor rights. The equal rights

of citizens and the unity of their rights and responsibilities are established (Article 48). Such political rights as the right to join and organize political parties, to take part in political life, and to administer state affairs are singled out (Articles 49, 50 and 55). In addition, Nicaraguans have the right to speak out individually or collectively with constructive criticism of the state and other authorities (Article 52).

Social rights cover a broad area of Nicaraguan citizens' lives. Let us single out the right to labor (Article 57), and social security (Articles 61 and 62), housing (Article 64), and protection from hunger (Article 63), among others. Naturally, the extent of the interval between the proclamation of rights in the basic law and their realization depends on a number of objective and subjective factors.

The country is undergoing an extremely difficult period economically, which cannot help but be reflected in the social area. The shortage of housing alone, according to estimates for 1985, amounted to over 326,000 dwellings. The level of medical service provided for the population is considered to be inadequate, and 140,000 children 7 to 12 years of age do not attend school, especially in the rural areas. For this reason, it is natural that the constitutional norms which affirm Nicaraguans' socioeconomic rights do not have sufficient material guarantees at present. At the same time, it has to be stated that definite steps have been taken in Nicaragua in recent years aimed at guaranteeing the basic social rights of citizens. Measures are being conducted to establish the necessary conditions for Nicaraguans to receive an education and medical assistance and housing is being built. Programs of social security being implemented by Nicaragua's Institute of Social Security and Welfare cover 37.3 percent of the country's employed population, and measures being undertaken in the area of social security as a whole are making it possible to include more than 51 percent of the residents in this system.

The basic law singles out citizens' family rights especially. Among the most important ones are those which relate to the state's protection of the family and the privileges granted to women for pregnancy and child care (Articles 62 and 74). The constitution affirms parents' responsibility to provide for and educate their children (Article 73) and children's obligation to support elderly parents (Article 75). Article 75, which guarantees equal rights for children, is important; it abolishes the property discrimination based on paternal authority in effect not only in Nicaragua, but in other Latin American countries as well.

The constitution establishes the foundations for the legal status of workers. Along with the right to labor, it affirms such pivotal rights as the right to equal wages for an equal quantity and quality of work and the right to participate in managing an enterprise's affairs within the limits established by law (Articles 81 and 82). Workers may unite freely in trade unions and provide for their group interests by concluding collective agreements or

by exercising the right to strike (Articles 83 and 87). Let us note that there is quite a high level of trade union activity in Nicaragua. More than 284,000 workers are members of 5,763 trade unions united in six trade union centers.

The nationality problem is quite acute for modern Nicaragua, and the basic law devotes an important place to its resolution. The autonomy of the Atlantic coast of the country is reflected in several sections of the constitution. Article 11, which proclaims Spanish as the national language, notes that the languages of communities on the Atlantic coast will also be used officially in cases stipulated by the law. The principles of autonomy are expressed most fully in Article 180, which affirms the right of communities on the Atlantic coast to develop those forms of public organization which are in accord with their historical and cultural traditions. The state guarantees the communities the right to use their natural resources and retain their forms of communal property, and the right to free elections of authorities and representatives. Retention of their culture, religion and customs is guaranteed as well.

Nicaragua's constitution has become the first in Latin America to especially affirm the national rights of Indians. At the same time, certain problems of the country's national minorities have not been settled. Thus, the principles of classifying certain lands in the communal category continue to be insufficiently clear. The problem of the right to the national resources of the Atlantic coast also has not been conclusively resolved. The problems cited will apparently be resolved finally in the law on autonomy; discussion of the draft of this law has been under way since 1985.¹

Nicaragua's new basic law contains valuable and effective standards which establish the necessary legal basis for the country's further development. The constitution has succeeded in balancing the "working" standards with those which are to be realized in the long term. The democratic content concentrated in the document of highest juridical force provides grounds for optimism in assessing the role of this most important document for the country in developing the revolutionary process and in enriching the experience of the liberation struggle.

Footnote

1. The law on autonomy was adopted on 3 September 1987.

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'Roundtable' on Latin America Security Problems Held

18070055f Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 87 pp 79-101

[Report on roundtable in Buenos Aires: "Problems of Latin American Security"]

[Excerpts] The situation in Latin America has become significantly more complicated in the 1980's. The vast Latin American region, home to over 400 million persons, has become an arena for aggressive, interventionist actions by the imperialist powers, "hot spots" have emerged here, the arms race has gathered momentum, and new foreign military bases and projects have appeared; a nuclear threat hangs over the countries of Latin America, and more and more persistent attempts are being made to draw them into Washington's military preparations, including the plans preparing for "Star Wars."

All this is stirring up a growing protest from the Latin American peoples, who are repudiating the imperialist circles' aggressive policy and widening their struggle against militarism and for democracy, peace and disarmament and independent political and socioeconomic development. But this struggle is developing into an extremely complex situation—under the conditions of incessant ideological and propagandist subversion by imperialism, which is attempting to cast aspersions on the foreign policy of the USSR and Cuba, discredit the activity of democratic and antiwar forces in countries in the region, whitewash the militaristic policy of the West, and in the final analysis, to keep the Latin American states in the orbit of the United States' military and political control.

A roundtable on these problems, organized jointly with the Latin American Institute of Technological Cooperation and International Relations (ILCTRI), was held in the journal's correspondents center in Buenos Aires. Taking part in the discussion were Norberto (Seresoli), the director of ILCTRI; retired General Ernesto Luis (Meyer), president of the Center of Servicemen for Democracy in Argentina (SEMIDA); Jose Luis Garcia, retired colonel, SEMIDA secretary, and staff member of the Latin American Institute for Geopolitical Research; Horacio (Giberti), president of the Argentine Economic Development Institute (IADE); Jorge Julio Greco, chief editor of the journal MEZHODUNARODNAYA POLITIKA [presumably POLITICA INTERNACIONAL] Mauricio Lebedinski, director of the Fund for Social and Political Research; Luis Cesar (Perlinger), retired colonel and staff member of the Institute of International Relations; Emilio (Corbier), Argentine journalist and scientist (the Juan B. Justo Fund); Juan (Jaimeso Cesio), retired colonel and member of the Party of Irreconcilables [neprimirymkh]; Captain Gustavo Druetta, staff member of the Center for Research on a National Plan;

journalist Cesar Pelassa (the CLARIN newspaper); economist Daniel (Solda) (IADE); exiled Chilean parliamentarian Luis Guastavino; Hernando (Kleimans), Argentine journalist and associate of the APN [NOVOSTI] Bureau in Buenos Aires; Russell (Bartley), professor from the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee (United States); I. N. Zorin, leading researcher of the IMEMO AN SSSR [World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences]; V. Ye. Reznichenko, member of the USSR Union of Writers and chief of the APN Bureau in Buenos Aires; and P. P. Yakovlev, our journal's correspondent in Argentina and for South American countries.

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USSR Trade Official on Soviet-Latin American Economic Ties

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[Article by V. L. Malkevich, USSR first deputy minister of foreign trade, under the rubric "Mutually Advantageous Collaboration: The Panorama and Prospects": "Taking Partners' Resources into Account More Completely"]

[Text] At the present time, the USSR has continuing commercial ties, based on appropriate trade agreements, particularly for Soviet machinery and equipment, with 14 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean basin. Settlements between the partners are made in freely convertible currency. All receipts from the sale of our equipment are used to purchase Latin American goods.

The Soviet Union's major partners in the region (aside from Cuba) are Nicaragua, Brazil, Argentina and Peru (90 percent of the total commodity turnover). The USSR sends them machinery and equipment (0.4 billion dollars in 1986), oil, fertilizer, chemical products, and other goods. Soviet products have proved themselves well in Latin America: aviation equipment in Peru; motor vehicles, including trucks, in Argentina, Bolivia, Jamaica, Peru and Ecuador; power generating equipment in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay; trolley buses in Colombia and Argentina; oil drilling equipment and equipment for nonferrous metallurgy in Argentina and Bolivia; tractors and agricultural machinery in Mexico, Argentina, Peru and Ecuador; machine tools in Brazil, Argentina and Peru; and many other types of equipment.

As far as Soviet imports are concerned, they are basically raw materials at present. They include grain, fodder and vegetable oils from Argentina and Brazil; bananas from Ecuador and Colombia; cacao beans and products from Brazil, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic; nonferrous ores and concentrates from Peru, Jamaica, Guyana and Bolivia; and wool and hides from Argentina and

Uruguay. In connection with the definite progress made in economic development by countries in the region in recent years and taking into account their interest in exporting industrial products, the Soviet Union has been purchasing pipe and rolled ferrous metals in Brazil and Mexico and consumer goods in these countries and Peru.

A number of Brazilian, Mexican and Argentine companies are offering to ship their machine building products for the Soviet market (drilling platforms, machine tools, heavy trucks, assemblies for drilling equipment, communications equipment, and so forth). There is no question that this matter requires close and careful study.

On the whole, however, it must be stated that the volume of commodity turnover with countries in the region is still not high (1.6 billion dollars in 1986, of which 0.6 billion were Soviet exports) and limited in the range of products. What is interfering with—or rather holding back—the progressive development of our trade relations? There are many reasons. In particular, they include insufficient knowledge of the export capabilities and import requirements of our partners, the availability of traditional suppliers and markets, both for the USSR and Latin American countries, and the complicated currency and financial situation of most of our contractors in the region.

Meanwhile, Latin America's role in the world economy is continuously increasing. Today Brazil and Mexico are among the new industrially developed nations and Argentina has made definite progress in industrial development; this cannot help but be taken into consideration. We are faced with the task of not only increasing commodity turnover, but giving it a qualitatively new character which corresponds to the level of our partners' capabilities. We must know each other well for this. The holding of exhibitions, symposiums and seminars is very important in this regard. The USSR traditionally takes part in the international fairs in Bogota and Lima. Organization of the annual Expo Brazil exhibition in Moscow by Brazilian companies has become a good tradition.

A factor holding back development of our relations, as already noted, is the complicated currency and financial situation in most Latin American countries. Under these conditions, the problem arises of finding new forms of mutually advantageous commercial cooperation. In particular, this involves the sale of licenses and technology, the conclusion of mutually coordinated export-import operations, an industrial cooperative system, the construction of major national economic projects, including on a compensatory basis, and the establishment of combined societies and joint enterprises and compensatory freight operations.

It should be said that work is already under way in these directions. A Soviet license has been sold to Brazil for the production of wood alcohol and the technology for dry quenching of coke; talks are under way for the sale to

Mexico of a number of licenses in the field of medicine and pharmacology; and Argentine firms are also displaying interest in Soviet licenses in this field. There is every reason to state that trade in licenses and technology may become a promising trend in our joint work in the very near future.

The conclusion of mutually coordinated export-import operations merits particular attention. It provides the opportunity to obtain the machines and equipment needed for our partners after paying for them with shipments of goods, including nontraditional exports. Soviet foreign trade organizations are interested in carrying out such operations and can offer the contractors a wide range of machinery and technical products. In working out operations such as this, it is important to determine the range of goods which are of mutual interest and to develop a flexible system of payments.

Soviet organizations have a great deal of experience in building large-scale projects abroad, including on a compensatory basis. This experience, in our opinion, can be utilized in Latin American countries as well. Agreements in principle on such cooperation have been reached with Brazil, where a ferromanganese plant will be built and irrigation operations will be carried out with the USSR's assistance. It is assumed that payments for the Soviet equipment and specialists' services will be with shipments of appropriate output.

Compensatory freight operations may be utilized for diversification of Latin American exports to the USSR. Payments for the freighting by Soviet ships in this case are also made with shipments of Latin American commodities—foodstuffs and industrial products, including consumer goods. The All-Union Association Sovfrakht is already engaged in an operation of this type with Brazilian and Mexican companies.

Taking the difficult currency and financial situation of their partners into account, foreign trade organizations of the USSR agree to clear the indebtedness for previously delivered Soviet equipment with local export commodities. The problem of the overdue debt of Peruvian firms was resolved in precisely this way.

The process of restructuring under way in our country in the management of foreign trade activity opens a wide range of prospects, particularly for such new forms of cooperation as the establishment of joint enterprises. A number of Argentine and Brazilian companies have already suggested that such enterprises be established in the USSR for the foodstuff, tanning and footwear industries. These proposals are being studied.

Questions related to trade relations with individual Latin American countries are regularly reviewed at meetings of mixed commissions and in the course of visits by and meetings with officials and businessmen. There is growing interest in developing them further and in making them long-term and stable in nature. In this

connection, the talks that the Soviet Union is holding with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico on the development of long-term cooperation programs in the economic and science and technology fields are of great importance.

Our joint efforts should be aimed at determining the most promising sectors of cooperation, expanding and diversifying mutually advantageous trade, and developing economic and trade relations on a long-term, stable basis.

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Soviet High-Tech Exports, Aid to Latin America Detailed

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[Article by Yu. N. Paniyev: "Scientific and Technical Relations: The Potential and Directions"]

[Text] No country in the world can be developed normally at present under conditions of scientific and technical autarky, not to mention Latin American countries, whose socioeconomic progress is provided for through imported foreign equipment and technology to a significant extent. The imperialist states and transnational corporations, which strive to maintain and strengthen the mechanism for reproduction of the region's economic dependence at a higher stage of development in productive forces, are taking advantage of this circumstance extensively. However, times are changing. Today the Latin American countries are able to have recourse to alternative sources of high technology and advanced skills. The trend toward reinforcement of relations in this area with states in the socialist community, chiefly the Soviet Union, has to be viewed in precisely this vein. It is important to note that, in contrast to the transnational corporations' effort to impose restrictions in the transfer of different types of technology, the licensing agreements concluded with Soviet organizations contain no conditions which would make their Latin American partners technologically and financially dependent. In particular, customers acquire the right to further develop the article under license.

The assertion widely propagandized in the West that only developed capitalist countries are capable of selling modern technology does not stand up to criticism. Soviet technology in the fields of power engineering, industrial chemistry, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, and a number of other sectors not only is not inferior to the level in the West, but often is simply unmatched. A very eloquent statement was made, for example, by the president of the Brazilian company Coalbra in responding to journalists' question on the reasons for selecting Soviet,

not American, technology for the production of methanol: "Only two countries in the world now possess this technology: the Soviet Union and Brazil."

Orders for the delivery of Soviet technology to Latin America are being made more and more frequently as the result of international tenders. This attests to its high competitiveness. One of the studies prepared by Argentine experts for UNCTAD states frankly that the Soviet technology and equipment offered in tenders for the Salto Grande Hydroelectric Power Plant proved to be the most acceptable for Argentina technically and economically.

The number of countries interested in cooperation is continuously increasing. While the USSR had an intergovernmental agreement on scientific and technical cooperation only with Bolivia in 1971, similar agreements were concluded after a few years with a number of states: with Argentina in 1974, Venezuela and Mexico in 1975, Peru in 1976, and with Brazil in 1981. Ties are being developed with Guyana, Colombia and Nicaragua within the framework of trade, economic, and scientific and technical cooperation agreements.

In expanding cooperation with Latin American countries, Soviet organizations strive to direct their joint efforts toward the solution of high-priority economic problems. Emphasis is placed on long-term intergovernmental agreements which ensure that the process of meeting partners' requirements for the needed skills and technology proceeds according to plan and contributes at the same time to the development and reinforcement of national scientific and technical potential. This area of cooperation covers the planning and construction of enterprises and projects in the industrial field and their infrastructure and the transfer of planning and technical documentation for the manufacture of machines and equipment, as well as licenses and specifications of technological processes and plans for organizing the work; joint study of scientific and technical problems with subsequent introduction of results in industrial and agricultural production; exploratory geological and hydrological operations; and the training of scientific personnel, technical and other specialists, and so forth. Soviet organizations establish the technical and economic groundwork for projects' construction, conduct laboratory and industrial tests and analyze local raw material, work out the processing and technical plans, prepare working drawings, and perform other types of technical engineering and consulting services. It is obvious that the transfer of a considerable amount of skill and experience, including advanced Soviet technology, is involved in these operations. For example, Bolivia obtained access to the unique technology for processing lean tin sulfide ores and concentrates by the fuming process thanks to the USSR's technical assistance in building a tin concentration plant.

Assistance to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Nicaragua and Peru in building large power generation projects

plays an important role in resolving problems of industrialization on a modern technological basis. For example, the capacity of power stations put into operation with participation by organizations from the USSR totals 1.8 million kilowatts in Brazil and 2.8 million kilowatts in Argentina.

Soviet-Argentine ties in this area merit examination in more detail. Our country is providing significant scientific and technical aid in the long-term program, planned up to the year 2000, to develop Argentina's power generation. Nearly one-fourth of the country's electricity is now being produced with Soviet equipment. In particular, the Salto Grande power plant, built with the USSR's technical assistance, is the second in volume of electric power generation. The San Nicolas Hydroelectric Power Station, the Komandante Luis Piedrabuena TES [Thermal Electric Power Station] in Bahia Blanca and the Costanera TES near Buenos Aires are among those that have been commissioned or readied for operation. These stations, which were planned by Soviet specialists, operate with equipment imported from the USSR or manufactured in Argentina with our technology. It is planned to manufacture several turbines and a number of assemblies for power generation units in accordance with Soviet designs for the Piedra del Aguila Hydroelectric Power Station.

The USSR has taken part in planning the Parana Medio Hydroelectric Power Complex, the largest in the region. Soviet specialists have provided assistance in drafting the plan for construction of the basic and auxiliary structures of the complex—two hydroelectric power stations and frontal dams, side embankments, reservoirs, spillways, and systems for irrigating agricultural land. One of the world's largest planning organizations in the field of hydraulic engineering—the Gidroyekt All-Union Scientific Research and Scientific Surveying Institute, after taking part in this work, also performed surveying work for the Alto Sinu Hydraulic Engineering Complex in Colombia. It is worthy of noting that certain important indicators for the equipment (the KPD [efficiency] of the hydraulic units, for example) which will be delivered by the Soviet Union exceed those required under the contract. When the Alto Sinu complex is put into operation, it will promote the development of the most backward regions in the northwestern part of the country by providing reliable electric power and irrigation for 350,000 hectares of agricultural land. It is assumed that the complex will provide work for tens of thousands of persons.

It is well known that the Soviet Union provided the technical and economic groundwork for the Olmos Hydraulic Engineering and Irrigation Complex in Peru. The objective of the project is to transfer the water from three rivers in the Amazon basin to the Olmos River valley through a 20-kilometer tunnel in the Andes. It is planned to build two power stations, three dams and a reservoir on the channel route. Planning and surveying work was completed in 1980 and the engineering plan for

construction was submitted to the Peruvian side. When the project is completed, it is planned to irrigate 122,000 hectares of arid land, which will make it possible to obtain up to 300,000 tons of grain, 350,000 tons of green sugar cane pulp, more than 700,000 tons of fodder, and 250,000 to 300,000 tons of vegetables and fruits annually. The irrigated area will provide work for 36,000 peasants. The electric power being generated will provide additional opportunities to develop industry, in the Bayovar region in particular. Soviet specialists have also assessed the power generation potential of the Huallaga, Ucayali and Marañon Rivers. As a result, Peru has acquired well-grounded data for the construction of new hydraulic engineering complexes.

Ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy is one of the high-priority directions for scientific and technical cooperation. Soviet specialists in Peru have prepared the technical and economic groundwork for construction of a metallurgical plant with a capacity of 2 million tons of steel annually in the Nazca region. After the plant for concentrating tin ore tailings (the town of Palca) was put into operation, a plan was drafted for construction of an enterprise to produce tin concentrates in Machacamarcá. Positive results also should be expected from implementation of the agreement between the USSR and Mexico, signed in 1984, on cooperation in the area of ferrous metallurgy.

Ties are also being strengthened with Brazilian firms. An agreement was signed in 1986 between the All-Union Association Tyazhpromeksport and the CBRD company which defines the responsibilities of the sides in the course of building a plant to produce ferromanganese with a capacity of 150,000 tons annually. An agreement also was concluded for the Litsenzintorg organization to provide consulting services to the Cozipa company in modernizing the technological processes at its enterprises.

The Soviet Union's assistance in prospecting for local national resources and developing them is also important for Latin American countries. Technical assistance in this area makes it possible to increase efficiency in utilizing raw materials and to create a material base which enables them to resist the domination of transnational corporations in this field. Soviet organizations are taking part in prospecting and exploratory operations for oil and gas in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Ecuador. An agreement was signed with Colombia in 1980, for example, for technical assistance in the search for oil, including help in interpreting data from seismic observations and organizing geochemical research. Interest in Soviet experience in developing oil deposits has increased in Venezuela lately: the state company Lagoven is successfully making use of the turbodrills which were shipped from the USSR for reaching wells up to 4,000 meters deep.

Considering the needs of the agrarian sector in Latin American states, the Soviet Union is prepared to expand its scientific and technical cooperation in this field. The

basic directions are to open up new lands and improve the use of those being cultivated by irrigation and chemical treatment, to transfer experience in plant growing, to mechanize agricultural operations, and to carry out scientific research jointly.

New lands are being developed and agricultural equipment is being repaired in Nicaragua with the aid of Soviet organizations. In April 1986, an agreement was reached between the USSR Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee] and the Nicaraguan Ministry of Agricultural-Livestock Development and Agrarian Reform on scientific and technical cooperation in agriculture. Our specialists have been working for several years in this country, as well as in Mexico, Peru and Ecuador, to increase the cotton crop yield. Under the agreement concluded in 1981 between scientific basis. A large-scale fish industry complex, built according to Soviet plans and provided with equipment shipped from the USSR, has been put into operation in Paita, Peru.

Favorable prospects for developing scientific and technical cooperation in transportation have taken shape recently. In September 1985, a contract was signed between the All-Union Association Tekhnostroyeksport and the Argentine Railway Administration for planning work to electrify the 122-kilometer scientific basis. A large-scale fish industry complex, built according to Soviet plans and provided with equipment shipped from the USSR, has been put into operation in Paita, Peru.

Favorable prospects for developing scientific and technical cooperation in transportation have taken shape recently. In September 1985, a contract was signed between the All-Union Association Tekhnostroyeksport and the Argentine Railway Administration for planning work to electrify the 122-kilometer section between Buenos Aires and Mercedes. The USSR assumed the responsibility for delivering the necessary engineering and electric equipment, assembling it, setting it up, and putting it into operation.

The transfer of technology is an important link in scientific and technical cooperation. It is arranged basically by two channels: indirectly, in connection with the export of complete sets of equipment, and in "pure form," that is, by the sale of licenses, patents, and "know-how." The sale of licenses occupies a minor position at present in the overall volume of Soviet-Latin American cooperation, since there are number of problems related to the uncoordinated standards and technical parameters, inadequate development of the system of information, and so forth. The pressure from transnational corporations, which have ensnared Latin America in networks of technological dependency, should not be disregarded, either. Nevertheless, positive shifts have taken shape as the result of mutual efforts undertaken in the transfer of technology from the USSR. It is important to note that this process is being extended to other

sectors in addition to industry, particularly to agriculture. Thus, Soviet technology for the laser treatment of seeds and the equipment for its use has already been patented in Brazil.

Much more often Latin American countries acquire so-called "accompanying" licenses in the process of assistance provided by the Soviet Union when economic projects are built. In accordance with the practice which has developed, the partners are provided with engineering plans and working drawings for enterprises, the planning documentation for the complete sets of equipment being delivered, a description of technological processes, and so forth. Production of glass insulators for high-voltage transmission lines in Mexico and methanol from eucalyptus wood in Brazil was organized under such conditions, for example.

Cooperative arrangements have been developed in recent years between Soviet and Latin American producers of machinery and equipment. For example, the Brazilian Uzimec company, after evaluating the merits of the largely unique Soviet power engineering equipment which was installed in the Sobradinho and Capivara Hydroelectric Power Stations, signed an agreement in 1986 with the All-Union Association Tekhnopromeksport on a cooperative production arrangement to manufacture turbines and generators for hydroelectric power stations being planned, including those in other countries.

Joint scientific research and studies have been increased to a certain extent. Implementation of the first program for scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and Brazil in the fields of physics, biology, biochemistry, ecology, agriculture, astronomy, mathematics, earth sciences, and so forth have received a positive assessment, for example. The program for 1986-1987 also includes joint studies in pure and applied sciences.

In the course of Argentine President R. Alfonsín's visit to the USSR (October 1986), the sides expressed their readiness to undertake a new program of scientific and technical cooperation for 1987-1988 providing for joint scientific research in a number of areas, particularly the peaceful uses of space and Antarctic studies, the exchange of scientists and experts, and the organization of other bilateral measures.

The training of national personnel plays an important role in the transfer of modern scientific and technical skills. Cooperation with Latin American countries in this area is developed by taking into account the partners' current requirements and development priorities. It is oriented in three basic directions at present: by organizing institutions for specialized secondary education and vocational and technical education centers; large-scale training of skilled workers during the construction and operation of economic projects; and sending Latin Americans to the Soviet Union for training. As an example, we can cite the opening of a training center for

power engineering workers in Nicaragua in 1984, as well as a polytechnical training center and a number of other educational institutions; the Soviet Union helped in organizing the curriculum, practical studies and laboratory experiments.

Training of national personnel is also being conducted on a multilateral basis, following the procedure of international organizations in the UN system, and this practice is being steadily expanded. International scientific seminars and symposiums are held every year in the USSR, and over 20 courses are being given to train those who have received UN grants through the UNIDO, UNCTAD, UNITAR, and other international organizations. Latin American specialists in the fields of metal working, arc welding, geology, chemistry, data processing, and other applied and social sciences are taking an active part in these activities. One of the recent examples in this area is the seminar held under UNITAR in Moscow and Dushanbe in September 1987 on the subject "The role of economic integration in the economic and social development of Latin American countries"; representatives from 14 states in the region and a number of regional and subregional integration groups took part in the seminar. Cooperation such as this also contributes to the development of ties with countries in the region with which intergovernmental relations have not been established.

The reinforcement of scientific and technical cooperation with Latin American countries in recent years attests to the mutual aspiration to begin utilizing the available resources in this field. In spite of the relatively strong contractual and legal foundation achieved by the mid-1980's, the level of Soviet-Latin American scientific and technical relations is far from meeting the sides' capabilities. We should note first of all that one of the basic reasons is the strong opposition of foreign monopoly capital, which is taking every step to stop and reverse the trend toward stronger cooperation between countries in the region and the Soviet Union. The traditional orientation maintained by many states in the region toward the technical skills and experience which the West has at its disposal is a definite obstacle. The progressive advancement of scientific and technical ties with the USSR is also being held back by the extremely difficult economic situation in the majority of Latin American countries and by the trend in them toward a cutback in the state sector. The inadequacy of mutually provided information on the requirements and capabilities of the partners should be added to this as well.

The path of advanced Soviet technology to Latin American consumers is often unjustifiably complicated. Paradoxically, the practice of buying technology of Soviet origin from firms in developed capitalist states first continues to exist. As a result, the customer countries are being deprived of the advantages of the direct transfer of technology and overexpend foreign exchange which is in short supply. In the view of J. Otero, director of the Mexican company Interchange Corporation de Mexico,

S. A., "only an ignorant person can agree that equipment for deep drilling produced under Soviet patents and with Soviet technology should be purchased in the United States instead of directly in the Soviet Union under more favorable long-term credit conditions." Cases in which Soviet technical skills in metallurgy were acquired by Brazil at significant additional cost from Japanese and Italian companies are well known. Soviet organizations engaged in marketing technology should also draw the necessary conclusions from the practice which has taken shape.

The Soviet Union's policy of expanding scientific and technical relations with developed and developing nations, including Latin American countries, is being reinforced by the truly revolutionary changes under way in our country in science, industry (machine building), and foreign trade. All this opens new opportunities for mutually advantageous cooperation.

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CEMA-Latin American Economic System Links Examined

18070055i Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 87 pp 113-120

[Article by A. I. Olshanyy: "CEMA and LAES [the Latin American Economic System]: Business Attraction"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Talks between delegations of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, headed by CEMA Secretary V. V. Sychev, and the Latin American Economic System, headed by LAES Permanent Secretary S. (Alegret), were held in Caracas in May 1987. Candidate of Economic Sciences A. I. Olshanyy, delegation member, adviser, and leader of the research group for cooperation with developing countries of the International Institute of Economic Problems in the World Socialist System (a CEMA research institute), tells us about the talks.

On the Path of Strengthening Ties

Speaking at the opening of the delegations' working meeting, S. (Alegret) emphasized that countries in Latin America and the Caribbean basin are suffering serious economic difficulties at the present time. The burden of foreign debts and extraordinary measures to put the economy in order entail difficult social consequences for peoples in the region. Meanwhile, the problem of indebtedness is not only not being resolved, it is becoming more acute. Serious problems in foreign trade are being added to the financial difficulties. Countries in the region are not in a position to cast off the chains of economic dependence and put an end to their vulnerable

condition in the international market, for they do not have the necessary resources to adapt themselves to the serious changes taking place in the world economy.

All this prompts us to think seriously about the character and nature of the part played by the region's countries in the world economy, S. (Alegret) noted. Relations with the CEMA and its member countries are of particular interest to us for this very reason. Diversification of foreign economic ties is one of the goals of the Panama Agreement which established the LAES. The first program for the organization's work adopted in 1976 mentioned how important it is to jointly formulate proposals aimed at expanding trade in Latin American raw materials and finished products, as well as cooperation in establishing enterprises and carrying out development projects in the region.

Let us recall that LAES Permanent Secretary Carlos Alzamora was the guest of CEMA at that time. S. (Alegret), who replaced him in this position in 1983, took part as an observer in the work of the 39th CEMA Session held in Havana in October 1984. He signed a memorandum with the CEMA secretary in Moscow in July 1986 which laid the foundation for subsequent joint work by the secretariats representing the governments of LAES and CEMA member countries and for specific proposals aimed at reinforcing and developing mutual cooperation.

The ties between the two organizations are already quite strong. One of the LAES member states, Cuba, is a full member of CEMA, and two others—Mexico and Nicaragua—have concluded multilateral agreements on cooperation with it. The more than 300 bilateral agreements among the states which are members of these integrated associations attest to the mutual interest in practical efforts to develop cooperation.

The trade-economic and technical ties between the two groups of states over the past 15 years have been marked by considerable dynamism. Hundreds of industrial enterprises and other projects have been and are being built with the socialist community's assistance. Industrial cooperative arrangements and other forms of collaboration have begun to be developed; reciprocal trade is becoming an integral part of the entire range of foreign economic ties. Training of national personnel is an important objective. Through the CEMA Scholarship Fund, which was established especially to provide assistance to developing countries in training specialists, citizens of the 14 LAES states are being trained in the educational institutions of CEMA member countries.

Far from all resources have been utilized, however. The CEMA member countries account for barely over 3 percent of the exports from Latin American and Caribbean basin states and less than 1 percent of their imports. But after all, this concerns the market of states where one-tenth of the world's population lives and which accounts for one-fourth of the world's national income!

S. (Alegret) noted in particular that an opportunity for cooperation involving new types of technology which are of considerable interest to states in the region was provided after the adoption of the Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress of the CEMA member countries in 1985. However, this does not exhaust all our opportunities by any means, as V. V. Sychev stressed in his address. There is a vast potential for cooperation and exchange which we must study and become familiar with.

A program for cooperation between the organizations' secretariats in 1987-1988 was agreed upon as a result of the talks. In particular, it provides for joint research on the condition of and prospects for trade and economic relations between CEMA and LAES countries and the organization of a seminar on these problems in Caracas in early 1988; the systematic exchange of information and documentation; and the development of cooperation in training national personnel.

The current stage marks the beginning of a shift to important quantitative and qualitative changes in relations between the two groups of countries. Practical steps must be undertaken for more intensive and comprehensive development of ties in an ascending line, combining an increase in the volume of trade, improvement in its structure, and expansion of industrial and scientific and technical cooperation with reinforcement of relations in the area of financing. Incentives to increase purchases of traditional commodities, semimanufactures, and finished industrial products in Latin American countries have been called upon to play an important role. It will probably be expedient in the future, when it is mutually acceptable, to provide for deliveries to repay credits, as well as commercial purchases of the output of enterprises built with assistance from the socialist countries.

An important role is assigned to multilateral cooperation, especially with Nicaragua. Work on 30 important projects in the fields of geological exploration, power engineering, the mining and agricultural industries, fishing, transportation, and so forth is being carried out here with aid from the CEMA countries. It includes overall agricultural development of the Sebaco Valley, development of the dairy industry in Muy Muy and Matiguas, construction of a textile combine in Esteli, and construction of the first deep-water port on the Atlantic coast, El Bluff. A program of cooperation with this country for training national personnel is being carried out on a multilateral basis in the 1986-1990 period. It provides for 12,800 Nicaraguan citizens to be enrolled in educational institutions and accepted at enterprises in the socialist countries; 460 of them will receive higher and secondary specialized education through the CEMA Scholarship Fund.

The development of cooperative arrangements between organizations in CEMA countries and Latin American firms aimed at including third countries in the markets is

promising as well. Opportunities for trilateral cooperation are far from being fully utilized, although definite positive experience already exists in this area.

The difficult financial and currency situation in Latin American countries may be alleviated to a certain extent by different export-import operations mutually coordinated with CEMA member countries. Thus, in different years Poland has delivered cargo ships, rails for railroads, and coking coal to Brazil, receiving coffee and iron ore in exchange. Under agreements in the early 1970's, Brazil has increased its exports of iron ore to Czechoslovakia in exchange for technical services in the planning, construction, and commissioning of a number of TES's [thermal electric power stations]. At the same time that it delivers equipment and provides technical services in building a number of electric power stations, the Soviet Union assumes reciprocal obligations—to obtain different commodities in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.

Considerable reserves are incorporated in industrial cooperative arrangements. Opportunities for the manufacture of equipment intended for export in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, using the components manufactured in CEMA countries and in accordance with their technical documentation, are being studied at present. In particular, Hungary is discussing the extension of international division of labor with Latin American countries on the basis of a cooperative arrangement for the assembly of buses and the production of agricultural machinery, refrigerators, air conditioners, equipment for the food industry, and so forth.

Implementation of the CEMA countries' comprehensive program for scientific and technical progress mentioned above opens extensive prospects for development of mutually beneficial ties. Further reinforcement of the scientific and technical and production potential of fraternal countries will make it possible to increase the assistance provided to Latin American states in overcoming their technological backwardness and accelerating the development of science and technology. The first steps have been taken to organize cooperation in fundamentally new areas, the peaceful uses of space in particular. Agreement has been reached for the USSR to provide assistance to Brazil in launching four earth satellites in the 1989-1994 period. This country will take part in the Soviet program for Mars research.

In turn, the CEMA member countries are interested in the technology offered by Latin American states. The Mexican Petroleum Institute, for example, has registered over 200 patents in less than two decades in the area of oil extraction and refining, as well as the manufacture of a number of petrochemical products. Brazilian technology in the use of biomass to obtain alcohol, as well as advanced technological processes in various areas of geology and machine building, is worthy of attention. It is no coincidence that a number of countries in the

socialist community are displaying interest in the finished industrial products of Brazilian firms: rotary loaders and highly productive helical compressors for mining machinery; special railroad cars for transporting fertilizers, cement and grain; gantry terminals; and other equipment.

The CEMA delegation expressed its view of the opportunities for Latin American states in certain sectors which are promising for cooperation after it visited Venezuela's industrial zone in the state of Bolivar.

In the Venezuelan Ruhr

Demonstrating their professional skill, the Venezuelan pilots smoothly took the six-place aircraft off the runway of the capital's airport. Gaining altitude, they flew the aircraft deftly close to the skyscrapers and the two parallel mountain ranges between which Caracas—"the city of eternal spring"—is situated. In an hour and a half, Sebastian (Alegret), as the cordial host, was pointing out the windows at one of the world's largest iron ore deposits at Cerro Bolivar, where mining is carried out by the open-cut method. He also talked about the Guiana Highlands, a unique geological storehouse where industrial deposits of manganese, nickel, chromium, and other ores, bauxite, gold, platinum, and diamonds were discovered in addition to the iron ore. The sun-scorched grasslands and the great Orinoco River, the third largest in Latin America, stretched out below.

The aircraft landed near Ciudad Guayana, one of the country's largest industrial centers. This entire region is called the Venezuelan Ruhr.

Specialists of worldwide prominence, including Mendoza Osio, president of the state company Siderurgica del Orinoco, S. A. and director of the Latin American Iron and Steel Institute, showed us the leading enterprises in this zone, providing exhaustive explanations. The CEMA delegation inspected the modern metallurgical combine with a complete production cycle, which has a capacity of about 5 million tons of steel annually and employs 15,000 persons. They in turn provide work for 150,000 Venezuelans at enterprises producing ferroalloys in the automotive, shipbuilding, electrical engineering and other sectors of the metal working industry and at various projects.

In the view of Venezuelan scientific and business circles, they now have to prepare for the "post-petroleum period" of development. And the metallurgical giant in Ciudad Guayana is making a more and more substantial contribution each year in the effort to diversify the economy and exports. Over 80 percent of the ferrous metal consumed by the country is produced at the combine. It includes flat and graded rolled stock, pipe, wire, and other varieties. Output valued at about 80 million dollars is shipped abroad from here every year.

A trend has become apparent in world metallurgy over the past 2 years to accelerate the construction of installations for direct reduction of iron, and it is no coincidence that the delegation's attention was drawn to Venezuela's achievements in this field. They showed us one of the world's largest facilities for producing iron ore pellets, with a capacity of 4.2 million tons annually, in two plants which form part of the combine. These plants utilize different technologies: one was developed by the American Midrex Company, and the other by (J y L), S. A. The only installation in the world which uses a fluidized bed with the "Fior" technology is operating here. Most of the output is being exported to the United States, Japan, and the FRG, as well as other countries.

The delegation had the opportunity to become familiar with the Interluminio Company's alumina plant, one of the largest in Latin America, which has a capacity of 1.1 million tons annually; its output is exported and part of it is delivered to the aluminum plant situated here. Work on expanding the aluminum rolled stock plant is being carried out not far away.

Gold drew the Spanish conquistadors to Venezuela, as to other countries in the New World. In their search for it, the conquerors gradually moved into the heart of the country. In the 17th century, they reached the Guayana region. The gold deposits here and there were rapidly depleted and the lands seized from the Indians were parceled out to the nobility and the priesthood. The Spaniards drove the Indians from the land and partly annihilated the tribes that lived along the banks of the Caroni River at its confluence with the Orinoco. The conquistadors took the women who caught their eye away with them. The same fate awaited the only daughter of a tribal chief, the young Guri. The Capuchin missionary accompanying a detachment of conquistadors selected precisely this dark-complexioned girl, who was exceptionally beautiful. No person or thing frightened the Spaniards here except the measles and smallpox, which they did not know how to cure yet. In the morning, upon arriving at the chief's hut to take his daughter away, the missionary recoiled after seeing that her face had been covered with red spots during the night from an incurable disease. It never occurred to the self-assured conqueror that the young Indian girl has done this by covering her face with red paint. This story was told to us on the banks of the Caroni, at the base of the hydroelectric station which bears the name of the rebellious and keen-witted girl.

A hydroelectric power station was built in the Nesuma Canyon, 90 kilometers upstream from the confluence into the Orinoco. The dam is 270 meters high and the reservoir that was created holds 135 billion cubic meters of water. Half of all the electricity consumed by the country is generated here; at present (until the Itaipu GES in Brazil is completely operational), it is the largest hydroelectric power station in the world, with a rated capacity of 10 million kilowatts.

Our story about "Guri" would be incomplete if we did not mention that the hydraulic power system is considered to be not only a very great engineering achievement, but a monumental work of art as well. The prominent Venezuelan artists and painters Carlos Cruz Diaz and Alejandro Otero performed their creative work here. Cruz Diaz created the delicate chromium-plated steel structures in the dam's walls and the murals in the rooms housing the machinery. The odd play of metal and colors changes with the angle from which it is viewed. The unusual nature of the picture is enhanced by portholes through which the red, green and blue light from specially installed projectors is emitted. The works of Cruz Diaz enable us to enter the world of the unexplored in decorative art.

Alejandro Otero, who was considered by Pablo Neruda to be one of the outstanding figures in the art of America, decorated the hydraulic power system with a "sun tower" 50 meters high which has a wingspan of 53 meters. A sundial laid out not far away from the tower, in the Plaza de Democracia, is one more materialization of his talent. Which also says that there is something for us to learn in the area of combining industry and art from a country which possesses vast experience in hydraulic engineering.

At its meeting of 14 and 15 September 1987, the CEMA Executive Committee approved measures to develop cooperation between CEMA and LAES for the 1987-1988 period. At the 13th session of the Latin American Council (the supreme body of LAES) which was held several days afterward, a resolution was adopted expressing support for the policy of reinforcing cooperation among the countries in these integrated systems and for continued contacts between the administrative bodies of both organizations. The delegates from 25 Latin American countries attending the meeting expressed their approval of the cooperation program which was adopted and the proposal to devote particular attention to such aspects as foreign trade, science and technology, maritime shipping, and financing. The resolution of the Latin American Council points out that relations between LAES and CEMA comprise part of the policy of diversifying Latin America's foreign economic ties with the aim of alleviating its economic vulnerability and strengthening its position in the international arena.

For his part, V. V. Sychev noted in response to questions from the journal NOVOYE VREMYA: "Overall development of trade-economic and scientific and technical ties with Latin American states, we believe, can establish the conditions for rapid and stable growth in mutual commodity turnover."¹

Work has already begun in the CEMA and LAES secretariats to implement the agreements reached in Caracas. An important step has been taken in developing fruitful and stable relations between our two organizations and their member countries. Joint work contributes to the maintenance and consolidation of peace, international

confidence and cooperation among states, and to the practical restructuring of the world economic system and the establishment of a universal system of economic security.

Footnote

1. NOVOYE VREMYA, No 28, 1987, p 3.

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U. S. Central American Policy Reviewed, Assessed
18070059b Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 12, Dec 87 pp 5-24

[Article by M. A. Oborotova: "The United States' Central American Policy: Results and Prospects"]

[Excerpts] Nineteen eighty-eight, the last year of R. Reagan's presidency and the year of an election campaign, a fierce struggle for the presidency, seething

passions and squaring of accounts, is getting closer. A year of summing up and defining the new policy which has been directed. We are also studying this.

Preliminary Results

According to statements by representatives of the U. S. administration, R. Reagan's policy in Central America is achieving good results. Not one country in the subregion "has fallen into the hands of the communists" in the past 7 years. Democracy is becoming firmly established in Central American states, with the exception of Nicaragua, through U. S. efforts. With Washington's assistance, the Duarte government in El Salvador is winning the war against the rebels and in Nicaragua, the ranks of the "democratic resistance" (the Contras—M. O.) which is continuing the struggle against the Sandinist government are expanding.¹

The cheerful assessments of Central American policy results from the current administration's viewpoint are not surprising. However, in order to give an objective assessment of the results of its subregional policy, it seems worthwhile to take the program for Central America advanced by the Republicans in 1980-1981 as a reference point. Let us recall that it was planned initially to turn Central America into the line of departure for the U. S. global offensive against "international communism." It was planned to deliver the first lightning strike against the Salvadoran rebels and to defeat them in a short period of time. After that it was planned to put down the revolutionary movement in other states in the subregion, do away with the Sandinist regime in Nicaragua, and possibly with socialist Cuba as well in the future. The Republicans' program in the second term of R. Reagan's presidency did not have the features of a blitzkrieg, but it was no less ambitious. After realizing that the "solution" of the Salvadoran problem would require a long period time, U. S. officials decided to concentrate their efforts on crushing revolutionary Nicaragua first of all. It was also planned to make progress in the struggle against the revolutionary movement in El Salvador and to restore American influence in Central America by the end of R. Reagan's presidency. These were the plans. And what are the results?

In Nicaragua, the tactic of bringing overall pressure to bear on the Sandinist government did not produce the desired results, on the whole. In spite of the many millions in military aid from the United States, the Contras proved to be incapable of winning any kind of serious military victory. NEWSWEEK correspondent R. Nordland, who was in one of the Contra detachments which penetrated Nicaraguan territory, provided eloquent evidence of this. In particular, he wrote: "The Contras have shown themselves to be consummate masters of retreat; with regard to attacks, they have nothing to brag about here. We left aside one headquarters-specified objective after another, since they did not dare to attack them." And further: "The Contras are suffering defeat in the battle for the minds and hearts of the

people. If they do not win this battle, they are unlikely to win the whole war... The guerrilla war is more of a political war than a military one."² There are many reasons for the absence of mass support for the Contras. The main ones are the Somozist past of most of the rebels' military leaders, the cruelty toward the civilian population, and the lack of a political program that is attractive to the Nicaraguans and charismatic civilian leaders. Let us add that the incessant discord among the Contras' military and civilian leaders naturally does not contribute to the effectiveness of their activity. The increasing military might, preparation and experience of the Sandinist People's Army, which is superior to the Contras in many respects, has to be taken into account as well. There are no grounds to assume that these important reasons will disappear in the near future. Accordingly, there are no grounds to believe that the Contras will be able to win a military victory.

The R. Reagan administration has stubbornly tried to isolate the Sandinists' government in the international arena for 7 years. As a result, they have been only partly successful in carrying this out in Central America, where El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica have supported American policy, but in far from everything, owing to their economic and military dependence on the United States, as well as their own interests in many respects. Admittedly, there is a certain "cooling" toward Nicaragua in a number of West European governments, chiefly France and the FRG. However, this is not so much as a service to R. Reagan's administration as it is the result of a swing to the right in the leadership of these countries. On the whole, the Republicans' policy has rather led to the point where the United States is in the minority on the Nicaraguan question in the international arena. The governments of many states in the capitalist world feel no sympathy for revolutionary Nicaragua, of course, although their disagreement with the U. S. administration's methods with respect to this country is obviously tipping the scales.

At the same time, Congress' approval of 70 million dollars in military aid to the Contras in 1986 has to be considered a definite achievement by R. Reagan. It will be recalled that Congress' ban on military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels was in effect in 1984-1985. Thus, an important obstacle was surmounted in R. Reagan's Central American policy in 1986. Congress was included in the undeclared war against Nicaragua, along with the CIA, the NSC, and other U. S. Government departments. This led to increased pressure on the Sandinists' government and forced it to allocate additional funds to defense needs, diverting them from solution of the country's urgent social and economic problems.

With the assistance of the United States, the Contras have succeeded in causing a great deal of damage to Nicaragua's economy, amounting to 2 to 4 billion dollars in 6 years.³ The country's production volume, imports and exports have decreased, inflation has soared, and the foreign debt has risen. The United States' economic

pressure (the discontinuation of American aid, the blocking of international credits, the establishment of a trade embargo) is having a negative effect on Nicaragua's economic situation as well. But this involves not only direct economic damage. Difficulties in economic development result in a lower standard of living, a decrease in the people's real incomes, the disappearance of many basic necessities, food rationing, and the emergence of shortages, the black market, and speculation. This in turn leads to an increase in the people's dissatisfaction with the government's policy.

Nevertheless, the increased dissatisfaction with the Sandinists is not equivalent by any means to increased support for the Contras, whom the Nicaraguans continue to consider as puppets of the United States who are fighting for a return to the past. Moreover, the FSLN continues to be the strongest political organization in the country, and it has no important political rivals. There are few parties in Nicaragua and they do not have much influence among the people. This fully applies to the civilian leaders of the Nicaraguan counterrevolution, A. Robelo and A. Cruz, as well. This is because of their ties with the former Somozists and the CIA, the fact that they are not well-known in their own country, and their social position—both of them are very wealthy, and it is no secret to anyone that they are fighting primarily to regain their lost privileges.⁴

In sum, the balance of the Republicans' policy toward Nicaragua looks like this. The Reagan administration has been able to create complications for the Sandinist leadership and to slow down the country's socioeconomic development. However, it has not succeeded in achieving the main objective—to remove the Sandinists from power and turn back the revolutionary process—and the prospects for reaching this goal in the foreseeable future are very pessimistic.

Reagan has managed to achieve more in El Salvador than in Nicaragua, at first glance. In 1984, the United States paved the way to a large extent for N. Duarte's victory in the presidential elections, and he remains in power to this day thanks to American assistance. Support for a right-centrist figure in El Salvador was the first indication of a definite evolution in the policy of the Reagan administration's allies, which was revealed to the full extent later on in Haiti, the Philippines, and South Korea.

It will be recalled that in 1981 the Republican administration adopted a policy of returning to the tradition—broken to a certain extent by J. Carter—of supporting the authoritarian and openly pro-American, anticommunist regimes in the Third World. In El Salvador, Reagan counted on military pressure, without ruling out military intervention, against the revolutionary movement in an alliance with rightist forces, including those in the extreme right wing. However, the policy, which was characterized by obvious anachronistic features, encountered the realities of the modern world and

resulted in an active protest in the international arena. The concept of a political settlement in El Salvador through talks by all the interested parties gained considerable popularity in the world. So that it did not turn out to be isolated, the Reagan administration was compelled to propose that elections be held in El Salvador as an alternative to this initiative. This decision was also influenced by the mood in the U. S. Congress, where the number of legislators protesting reliance on a military solution alone and speaking out in support of a peaceful settlement began to increase. In order to wipe out the revolutionary movement, it was necessary for the White House, after obtaining Congress' consent, to methodically increase military assistance to the Salvadoran regime. Therefore, the holding of elections, which would create the appearance of a political settlement in accordance with the administration's plan, pursued the objective of neutralizing the American legislators' opposition to increased aid for the Salvadoran army.

Thus, although the Reagan administration managed to complicate the development of the revolutionary movement, it was unable to either destroy it or weaken it to the extent that it ceased to play an important role in the country's political life. And what is no less important—the increased pressure on Duarte from the left and the right attests to the fact that the U. S. attempts to create a political center in El Salvador artificially are very far from being successful, for the center itself, which never was strong, is threatened with collapse.

While the balance of Reagan's policy in Nicaragua and El Salvador is shaped from forces which function in different ways, the picture with respect to Guatemala is quite clear. In 1982-1983, the Guatemalan military was able to stop the advance of revolutionary forces independently by unleashing terror unprecedented in scale among the population, which supported the guerrillas. In 1984, after encountering increased dissatisfaction with their activity in the country, on one hand, and the negative consequences of an economic crisis on the other hand, they began a process of liberalization which was consummated with a civilian government's assumption of power in 1986. In this case, the Reagan administration took practically no part, either in weakening the revolutionary movement or in the transfer of power to civilian officials.

In Honduras as in Guatemala, the Republicans' government did not play as significant a role in the shift from military to civilian rule which took place in 1982. For this reason, to say that the United States has been the standard-bearer of democratization in Central America is not simply to exaggerate, but to badly distort the facts. Especially since the military in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador retain vast influence over the political life of the country, and the "democracies" are very fragile, or more accurately, formal ones.

Since mid-1982, the Reagan administration has undertaken active steps to enlist Costa Rica's support for its policy in the subregion, making use of its dependence on

the United States and its interest in receiving American aid. A foreign debt in excess of 4 billion dollars—the largest per capita in Latin America—hangs over the economy of Costa Rica.¹¹ In the first half of the 1980's, the economic crisis "struck" the country perceptibly. Thus, its gross national product fell by 7 percent in 1982. Many assumed then that Costa Rica was on the verge of disaster. However, with U. S. aid, the dollar flow poured into the country and the negative trends in the Costa Rican economy were neutralized to a lesser degree for some time. Nevertheless, so that the economy stays "afloat," continuous financial injections, which Costa Rica receives punctually from the United States, are required. In 1986 alone, American aid to Costa Rica amounted to 120 million dollars¹³—a considerable sum if the diminutive size of the country is taken into account. Costa Rica has had to pay for the U. S. aid with concessions in its foreign policy, especially with respect to Nicaragua, and by allowing the presence of the Contras in its territory in particular.

The ideological factor serves the interests of the United States as well as the economic factor. The country's president, members of the government, and many representatives of Costa Rica's ruling circles frankly dislike the Sandinists. They believe that the Sandinists have "betrayed" the 1979 revolution by creating "a second Cuba" instead of a new Nicaragua (a bourgeois-democratic state following the model of Costa Rica). The Sandinist regime, in the view of the Costa Rican leadership, represents a threat to Central American states. For this reason, it is necessary to limit the power of the Sandinists before it is too late and force them to make substantial concessions in their domestic and foreign policy. Thus, the views of the American and Costa Rican leaders coincide to a large extent as far as anti-Sandinism is concerned.

At the same time, despite the favorable concurrence of circumstances, as well as the United States' crude pressure on the government of Costa Rica, the Reagan administration has not managed to obtain 100-percent support of its Central American policy from this country. Unlike the United States, Costa Rica actively opposes a military solution—from intervention to military assistance to the Contras—believing that it is capable only of increasing tension in the subregion. In the opinion of the country's president, no matter what military assistance the Contras receive, they never will be able to bring about the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government. Internal changes in Nicaragua can be achieved only by political means—by collective diplomatic pressure on the Sandinist government by the states of Latin America and Western Europe. Within the framework of a political settlement, he places emphasis on the necessity of Nicaragua's "democratization," interpreting it mainly as a narrowing of the Sandinists' power and an expansion of the power of bourgeois-democratic forces and national reconciliation. This approach to settlement of the Nicaraguan conflict is embodied in the "Arias Plan," which

later became the basis for drafting the Guatemala Agreement, which is discussed below. We will note here that Costa Rica's efforts on behalf of a political settlement of the conflict in Central America create certain difficulties for the Reagan policy, mainly the provision of military support for the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries.

Thus, compared with the Republican administration's ambitious plans in Central America, the preliminary results of its policy look rather insignificant. It cannot be denied that Reagan has achieved certain intermediate results in the subregion, primarily in El Salvador, but on the whole his accomplishments are minimal and may turn out to be unsuccessful in the long term. He has not reached his basic objectives in each of the Central American countries: putting down the revolutionary movement in the subregion as a whole, restoring American influence there, and turning this whole region into a front for the global offensive against communism. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that many social and economic problems remain in Central America which "feed" the revolution, and accordingly, the groundwork is being laid for future revolutionary upsurges.

Will such results satisfy Reagan? This is far from a rhetorical question. The prospects for the Republican government's policy in Central America and its end results depend on the answer to it.

It is rather difficult to answer this question. The fact is that ambiguity is characteristic of Reagan and his policy. There is Reagan the ideologue, who looks at what is taking place in the world through the prism of antagonism between two systems and who leads the uncompromising struggle against "world communism." The results of Central American policy cited above are unlikely to satisfy this Reagan. After all, stopping with what has been achieved, in fact, means for him admitting that the world's leading capitalist power could not "put things in order" in its own sphere of influence. Moreover, for a president who has made his prestige dependent on the outcome of the struggle against Nicaragua, any result other than removal of the Sandinists from power will be humiliating. But there is also Reagan the pragmatist, who ran for a second term of office. Intermediate results, represented accordingly on the propaganda level as an administration victory, of course, may satisfy such a president completely.

Moreover, the problem involves not only and not so much Reagan and the characteristics of his policy. The administration's policy in Latin America is being determined more and more now by factors that are not Central American, but mainly inter-American. The first of them is related to the "Iran-Contra" scandal. The second one is related to the forthcoming presidential elections in the United States. Everything in its order, however.

The Prospects for U. S. Central American Policy

One of the first questions which arises in determining the United States' prospects in Central America in the last year of Reagan's presidency is whether Nicaragua will become a place for "dramatic" action aimed at increasing the prestige of the Republican administration.²⁵ The following arguments may be cited in favor of carrying out such an operation. First of all, the pressure on the administration from the new right. Secondly, the ineffectiveness of other methods of struggle, mainly support of the Contras. And thirdly, the U. S. President's approach to the question of intervention in Nicaragua. If Reagan is convinced that an armed invasion will bring a quick victory with minimum losses in materiel and personnel for the United States and that American troops can be withdrawn from Nicaragua in a short period of time, he will not have any doubt about the expediency of such a step. At the same time, the majority of Americans and members of Congress will approve of the Sandinists' overthrow after the fact, when it has been accomplished "with little bloodshed." However, such an intervention scenario is unlikely.

According to estimates by U. S. Defense Department specialists, a minimum of four to six American divisions would be required in the initial stage of intervention in Nicaragua. In approximately 4 months, part of the troops would be withdrawn and the rest would form the occupation army. After this, another 4 years and 8 months would be required to "pacify" the country. U. S. casualties during this war would be in excess of 10,000, and could even reach 20,000, and the cost of the entire operation would amount to 4.5 billion dollars.²⁶ There are other scenarios for intervention in Nicaragua which envision less losses for the United States. However, the majority of specialists agree that an invasion would involve a lengthy guerrilla war in Nicaragua.

It is not surprising that the American military, including C. Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are opposed to such an operation. There is no question that the majority of Republican Party leaders would categorically oppose such a risky step on the threshold of the 1988 elections. All this sharply reduces the likelihood of wide-scale U. S. intervention in Nicaragua. Especially since the administration has already selected other areas of foreign policy (relations with the USSR) and other parts of the world (the Persian Gulf) to draw Americans' attention away from the "Iran-Contra" scandal. For the present, Central America has been left in reserve—in the event that there is a breakdown in the areas cited above. But even in this hypothetical case, the United States is unlikely to launch large-scale intervention in Central America; it is more likely to limit itself to bombing or a blockade if they consider it possible and necessary to carry out military actions in general.

Aside from military actions, the United States has two more alternative policies—continuation of the previous policy or a change in it, or more specifically, a turn to

peaceful settlement. Important events have taken place lately in the area of a political solution of the Central American conflict. It would appear that the fading process of peaceful settlement received a powerful impetus unexpectedly. On 7 August 1987, the presidents of five countries in the subregion signed an agreement in Guatemala, "Measures to establish a durable and lasting peace in Central America." The document, drafted with active assistance from Contadora and a support group, provided for national reconciliation, for the purpose of which the governments will begin a dialogue with all unarmed domestic opposition groups, as well as with those forces which take advantage of an amnesty; an appeal by the governments to the irregular forces and insurgent movements to cease military actions; democratization, particularly of elections in each of the countries, as well as elections to the Central American Parliament; discontinuation of aid to irregular forces and insurgent movements; and continuation of talks on the unsettled aspects of the Contadora Group's Act of Peace.

The very fact that the leaders of Central American states, among whom there were apparently irreconcilable differences on the question of a settlement of the conflict, were able to come to an agreement was unquestionably of positive significance and represented an important step toward the establishment of peace in the region. However, the fact that the Central American countries meeting in Guatemala did not even begin to discuss the plan for settling the conflict which Washington proposed to them was no less significant.

The American plan, prepared as a first step by the administration jointly with the speaker of the House of Representatives, Democrat J. Wright (in this connection, they have begun calling it the Reagan-Wright Plan), and the leaders of both parties in the Congress, provided for an immediate cease-fire in Nicaragua. After this, it was planned to stop military aid to the Contras if Nicaragua stops receiving foreign military assistance, and to stop American military maneuvers in Honduras; to restore citizens' rights and freedoms in Nicaragua and to create a multiparty commission to organize elections in this country; and to hold talks among the United States, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua on the reduction of armed forces in Central America and the withdrawal of foreign military personnel and advisers ("beyond the normal and legal requirements of the subregion"). The plan also asked for national reconciliation and a dialogue among the citizens of Nicaragua, as well as an arrangement to demobilize the armed forces of the Contras and the Sandinists. And finally, it provided for the U. S. economic embargo to be lifted in the future and for Nicaragua to be granted the right to take part in R. Reagan's "Caribbean Initiative." The talks were to have been held over a 60-day period, ending on 30 September 1987.

The period set for military assistance expired on the same day, and the coincidence between the two events was obviously not accidental. Regardless of what J.

Wright, who had always been ambivalent on the question of aid to the Contras, and his collaborators in the Democratic Party were guided by, the administration's intention raised practically no doubts. In the event that the Nicaraguan Government rejected the agreement cited, (and a rejection was foreordained, for the plan deliberately contained provisions that were unacceptable to the Sandinists), the U. S. Government acquired an excellent pretext to continue military assistance to the Contras and neutralize the opposition in Congress which had increased as a result of "Irangate."

Along with provisions unacceptable to Nicaragua, the Reagan-Wright Plan contained a number of points which took advantage of the support, both in Central America and in the ranks of the opposition in Congress, for the administration's subregional policy. In other words, it was obviously calculated to arouse the interest of these forces. Indeed, a rather large number of Democrats in Congress supported this initiative. However, the administration's subtle political moves were nullified by the conclusion of the Guatemala Agreement. Adoption of the agreement created serious complications for the provision of aid to the Contras and the conduct of American policy in the subregion as a whole. First of all, Nicaragua signed this document, and it was difficult to accuse it (in this stage, in any event) of "undermining a peaceful settlement in Central America." Secondly, the agreement provided for the discontinuation of military assistance to irregular forces. And thirdly, it did not include the point on direct talks between the Sandinists and the armed opposition at all, and it was precisely this that was one of the United States' main demands of the Nicaraguan Government.

The Guatemalan Agreement received very wide recognition in the world, as well as rather substantial support from Democrats in the American Congress. However, pressure on the administration from conservative forces, demanding categorically that aid to the Contras be continued, was sharply increased. As a result, the Republican government, which found itself between two fires, encountered a dilemma: whether to continue the previous policy or to take a step toward a peaceful settlement after supporting the agreement.

The question arises here whether the current administration is capable in principle of constructive participation in the process of a peaceful settlement in Central America which would take not only the interests of the U. S. Government, but those of Nicaragua, into account. The Republicans' political practice in the subregion clearly militates against this. For 7 years the administration has consistently pursued a policy of undermining the positions of the Sandinist government, torpedoing all attempts at a peaceful settlement of the Central American conflict in the process. And deviation from this policy in the final year would seem simply illogical. One may retort that the talks with the USSR on disarmament have shown that the Republican government is capable of definite pragmatism, of course. However, experience

shows that the course pursued toward talks with the USSR was accompanied by a toughening of U.S. policy in the Third World. It also seems that in making certain concessions in one area of foreign policy, the administration will compensate for them in another area in order not to "lose face" before the neoconservatives, whose support it badly needs. This conclusion is supported by the United States' tactics in making implementation of the Guatemala Agreement difficult, as well as R. Reagan's direct actions. On 22 August, the American President made a radio broadcast in which he called upon the Contras to continue their struggle until victory and also assured the rebels of the United States' unfailing support. A month later, he officially declared his intention to ask Congress for 70 million dollars in aid to the Contras. Thus, constructive participation by the current administration in the process of peaceful settlement appears unlikely.

What is left? Support for the Contras remains. This measure does not enjoy the necessary support at the Capitol at present. However, the congressmen's positions may be changed if the process of peaceful settlement in Central America is dragged out or slips. And there are serious grounds for this. And this involves not only the opposition of the United States, which has powerful levers of influence over its Central American allies. Sufficient grounds already have been established to conclude that far from all participants in the process of national reconciliation will carry out provisions in the document which do not suit them completely. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the Guatemala Agreement does not take the place of the Contadora group's Act of Peace. But only the adoption and implementation of the Contadora document can lead to a final political settlement in Central America. Meanwhile, there are important provisions in the Act of Peace on which agreement has not been reached and profound differences exist over them. In a word, serious obstacles remain on the path to a peaceful settlement in Central America which make it problematical in the near future, and accordingly, the passage by the U.S. Congress of certain sums for aid to the Contras is probable. Thus, in the final analysis, provision of assistance to the Contras remains the most likely direction for the policy of R. Reagan's administration.

In determining the prospects for Washington's policy, we have to dwell on the question of the place held by the different Central American countries in the system of U. S. foreign policy priorities in the subregion. Without any question, the first place is held by revolutionary Nicaragua. The President and administration of the United States have tied their prestige too strongly to the outcome of the struggle against this country, and the aspiration to restore American influence there is too great for Washington to devote less attention to Nicaragua. El Salvador obviously is second in the system of priorities. In connection with a weakening of N. Duarte's positions, the United States will be forced to exert even greater efforts to maintain the status quo in this country and to weaken the revolutionary movement.

To all appearances, the direction of the White House's policy toward Panama, whose importance has sharply increased lately, will undergo the most change. On one hand, this is related to the increasing instability in this country which has been latent since the early 1980's and which came to the surface in June 1987 when the country was caught up in the demonstrations by right-wing forces. On the other hand, it is related to the accumulation of disputes in relations between the United States and Panama over roughly the same period, which led to a foreign policy crisis in the summer of 1987 when the Reagan administration stopped economic and military aid to this country, and the American Senate adopted an unprecedented resolution of an interventionist nature in which it recommended that Panama democratize its political life, respect human rights, and investigate the activities of the commander in chief of the Panama Defense Forces, M. Noriega.

Because of the interoceanic canal in Panama's territory, which is strategically and economically important to the United States, the American military bases, and the Southern Command of the United States' armed forces, as well as the presence of a considerable number of American banks and companies, Washington has always been interested in keeping stable pro-American governments in power in this country. The importance of this has increased even more with the approach of the year 2000, when control of the canal is to be turned over completely to Panama under the Torrijos-Carter agreement, as well as with the development of the revolutionary movement in Central America. However, the present leadership of Panama, and especially the leadership of the country's armed forces under M. Noriega, which have played a dominant role in the country since O. Torrijos' time and are able to act with too much independence in the area of domestic and foreign policy, from the White House's viewpoint, has been less and less suitable to the Reagan administration. Since roughly mid-1985, the U. S. Government has pursued a policy of removing M. Noriega from his position as commander in chief of the Panama Defense Forces and replacing him with a more "reliable" person. This was considered an important step aimed at bringing a right-wing or at least a right-centrist government, under Washington's control, to power in Panama.

In December 1985, J. Poindexter bluntly recommended that M. Noriega retire voluntarily. In the spring of 1986, extreme right-wing Senator J. Helms began provocative hearings on Panama in Congress. That summer, journalist S. Hersh, who has important contacts in U.S. Government circles, wrote several articles in THE NEW YORK TIMES in which he accused M. Noriega of drug trafficking, aiding Latin American revolutionaries, links with Cuba, and other "mortal sins."²⁷ A year later, the United States was actively supporting statements by right-wing forces in Panama who were dissatisfied with the government's economic policy, and mainly with the extended rule by the military, which aspires to take over the political power. However, this did not lead to the

removal of M. Noriega, whose positions in the country have turned out to be quite strong. Along with support from the president and the ruling Democratic Revolutionary Party, he has been supported by the trade unions and even more importantly by the armed forces, where there has been no dissension in spite of U. S. hopes. Nevertheless, the United States is unlikely to refrain from taking part in the Panamanian situation. In the view of a prominent American specialist on Central America, R. (Millet,) the United States cannot allow its vitally important security interests and economic interests to suffer as a result of events in Panama.²⁸ The only question is what path Washington will choose to achieve its objectives.

In conclusion, we will attempt to look beyond the "Reagan era" and determine the prospects for the United States' Central American policy in very general terms after the current administration leaves. To a certain extent, Washington's subregional policy will depend on which party wins the 1988 elections. If the Republicans win, continuation of the current policy (with minor changes) is more than likely. Three principal contenders for the nomination for president from this party (G. Bush, R. Dole, and J. Kemp) have expressed their negative attitude toward the Guatemala Agreement and have advocated increased military aid to the Contras and have also stressed the necessity of combating "the Soviet threat in Central America." At the same time, the Republicans do not really have much chance of winning the struggle for the presidency. First of all, this is related to the fact that the Republican Party, although to a lesser extent than the administration, has suffered from "Irangate" all the same. Secondly, over R. Reagan's two terms in office, a considerable amount of dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his policy has built up among Americans, and the Republican "troika" is not offering anything fundamentally new. And thirdly, Americans are simply weary of Reagan's age, and their preferences lean toward a young, dynamic President, while the Republican Party contenders are elderly. All this increases the Democratic Party's chances in the presidential elections.

The Democrats, true, have not yet worked out an alternative program, including one for Central America. However, their positions have been strengthened somewhat as the result of "Irangate," for the weakening of Regan and the Republican Party has worked objectively in their favor. Moreover, there are many young, energetic contenders from the Democratic Party who possess the oratorical skill of politicians and who may well prove to be attractive to Americans. It also must be taken into account that a trend toward unity has been observed lately in the ranks of the Democratic Party.

In the event that a candidate from the Democratic Party wins the presidential election, a certain softening of the U.S. Central American policy is possible: a greater swing toward peaceful settlement and less support for the Contras. However, we can now say that a return by the

Democrats to "early" Carter liberalism is practically impossible. And the Democratic Party is not the same now—it has shifted to the right. And the liberalism of the past does not enjoy popularity in the country. And the main point is that neoconservatism, which is deeply rooted in American society, is capable of exerting considerable influence on the policy of any administration, including a Democratic one.

Footnotes

1. Department of State Bulletin, Washington, 1987, Vol 87, No 2120, pp 17-18; Vol 86, No 2114, pp 18, 20.

2. NEWSWEEK, New York, 1987, Vol 109, No 22, pp 24, 27.

3. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Paris, May 1987; B. Burns, "At War in Nicaragua," New York, 1987, p 62.

4. For more detail, see B. Burns, op. cit., p 66.

11. LIBERACION, Paris, 12 March 1986.

12. Ibid.

13. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, May 1987.

25. "Dramatic" action may be intervention, the bombing of key objectives (the type that was carried out in Libya in the spring of 1986), or a naval blockade.

26. CURRENT HISTORY, Philadelphia, 1986, Vol 85, No 515, p 404.

27. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 12, 13, and 22 June 1986.

28. JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, New York, 10 July 1987.

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Mutual Dependence, Contradictions in U.S.-Mexico Relations

18070059c Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 12, Dec 87 pp 25-32

[Article by B. F. Martynov and V. P. Sudarev: "The United States and Mexico: The Crisis in the Model of Bilateral Relations"]

[Text] Relations between the United States and Mexico have always been distinguished by their unique character, but there are grounds today to speak of the special model for them which was developed in the postwar

decades and which represents a rather isolated component in international relations in the Western Hemisphere. The basic element of it is the mutual interest in strengthening the political system which has taken shape in Mexico. It is viewed by the United States as a condition for the further integration of Mexico, which takes the form of even greater coordination of its development with the interests of the North American market. For their part, the Mexican ruling circles, by showing interest in American investments, have strived, and at times not without success, to bring about preferential economic ties with the United States, to obtain trade privileges, and to make use of the common border as a unique escape valve for the excessive social activity. At the same time, by taking the deeply rooted tradition of anti-Americanism into account, the Mexican ruling circles have been able to reinforce broad limits for autonomy in the model of bilateral relations. In the area of foreign policy, this has not only made it possible for it to distance itself considerably from the United States; it has also made possible a conflict on a number of urgent issues, an open polemic with Washington, and anti-imperialist actions in the international arena.

The potential for disputes in American-Mexican relations has always been present. However, by being sufficiently flexible, the model has made it possible to take the sharpness away from contradictions for certain periods of time, by reducing the friction with "grease"—new loans, trade concessions, and so forth. The United States has adapted itself adequately to a political contractor that is unusual for it—the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)—and particularly to its revolutionary phraseology and independent foreign policy, as well as the machinery developed for interaction between domestic and foreign policy. However, beginning in the second half of the 1970's, the intensified contradictions became more difficult to control within the framework of the existing model. The dispute grew rapidly over a number of positions, primarily over such traditional "sore points" as foreign trade contradictions and border emigration. Mexico began to incur larger and larger losses with the increase in protectionist tendencies in U.S. trade policy. And the toughening of Washington's immigration policy was regarded by Mexican ruling circles as a flagrant violation of the "rules of the game."

The financial and economic crisis unleashed in Mexico in 1982, which was unprecedented in scope, became the detonator for further aggravation. It sharply increased social tension, narrowed the mass support of the regime, and substantially weakened the PRI's traditional levers of control over the situation in the country. Mainly the right-wing forces, represented by the National Action Party (PAN) were able to take advantage of the situation; the PAN managed to shake the PRI's once exclusive positions (mainly in the northern states), and to turn into a major opposition force after acquiring the name "Reaganist."

The crisis distinctly revealed the high level of financial and economic attachment to the northern neighbor.

More than a quarter of the foreign debt (about 25 billion dollars) was owed to U.S. banks; only the Machiladoras complex on the border provides about 1.3 billion dollars in foreign exchange revenue to Mexico annually. The Reagan administration had a powerful lever of pressure on the government of M. de la Madrid. Precisely for this reason, the "package of conditions" set forth by Washington (reduction of state expenditures, allowing more freedom of access to the country for TNK's [transnational corporations], liberalization of foreign trade and currency control, and so forth) which Mexico was to carry out in exchange for U.S. financial support was accepted on the whole. The Mexican side had practically no alternative within the framework of the system of relationships which had taken shape.

However, the open pressure by the United States, which hoped to force Mexico to repudiate a number of the traditional components of its policy (the role of the state sector in the economy) and establish stricter control over its socioeconomic development, led to the beginning of a new link in American-Mexican contradictions, since it was obvious that neither the ideology nor the political practice of the PRI blended with the controlled policy scheme being imposed in the country. Moreover, the government of M. de la Madrid was successful in defending his positions on a number of matters (returning the banking system to the private sector, the state's complete withdrawal from a number of leading sectors, and so forth).

Being subjected to frontal pressure from Washington at the height of the financial and economic crisis, Mexico was also able to maintain consistency in its Central American policy, consolidating its positions by extending foreign policy cooperation with Latin American countries.

Aggravation of American-Mexican relations in the mid-1980's threw light on a number of important new factors which will play an increasing role in their further evolution, to all appearances. With all their completely obvious asymmetry, the two countries are becoming more and more interdependent. In 1982 alone, about 200,000 Americans lost their jobs because of the economic crisis in Mexico, which affected the interests of every fourth major company in the United States. Mexico's unpaid debt to private American banks is fraught with grave consequences for the financial system of the United States. At this time, Mexico is the United States' third largest trading partner, which also increases its interest in Mexico's economic and political stability. "Stability in Mexico," in the view of Arizona's Democratic Senator D. DeConcini, "will occupy the position of greatest political importance for the United States, with the possible exception of the strategic balance with the USSR, in the next decade."¹

In addition to these factors of continuing importance, one more was added in the middle of the past decade—the prospect that the common border between the two

states may turn into a new long-term "hot spot." The most critical problem in border relationships is the problem of illegal immigration, which has sharply intensified the demographic aspects of interdependence in recent years. Each year 1 to 1.5 million immigrants come to the United States from Mexico in search of temporary work; only 200,000 of them have entry documents. In addition, more than 5 million "chicanos"—persons of Mexican descent, who are the largest national minority today (after the blacks)—are permanent residents in the United States.

Intensification of demographic interdependence has involved an "extension" of other problems—socioeconomic, language, and racial. The toughened border control measures under the Reagan administration, the more frequent arrests and deportation of immigrants who enter American territory illegally (more than 1 million were deported in 1984 alone), and the humiliating and often inhumane treatment of immigrants in the United States have aroused the indignation of the Mexican public and a corresponding reaction from official Mexico.

Aside from the problem of illegal immigration, the border situation has assumed disturbing aspects related to the smuggling of drugs and weapons and the increase in crime in the American states which share a border with Mexico. However, Washington's measures to provide for the security of its southern border have been somewhat more extensive than simply a struggle against illegal immigration and smuggling. In April 1986, Army and National Guard units of the United States conducted operations to protect "strategic buildings" and the international airport in the city of El Paso (Texas), as well as 26 check points on the American-Mexican border, from "terrorists." On 16 May, the Texas border was "under the cover" of 20,000 American servicemen and F-15 fighters assigned to these units. In June, reinforcement of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which exercises control on the southern border, was announced, as well as the addition of several hundred more federal agents "to combat arms and drug smuggling, illegal immigration, and other illegal activity."² The managers of the INS itself have repeatedly stated the need to erect a wall along the entire 3,200-kilometer border. In November, President Reagan ordered that personnel in this service be increased by 50 percent, and that employees be armed with M-14 automatic rifles and provided with armored personnel carriers.

Various types of voluntary "patrols" and "teams" of racist Americans, who are taking the solution of the Mexican immigrant problem "into their own hands," are coming more and more often "to the assistance" of INS agents. The immigrants are "not remaining in debt," either: in 1985 alone, eight INS agents who were attempting to prevent border crossings were wounded by firearms. The same year, in the border town of San

Ysidro, south of San Diego, California, eight murders and 158 armed robberies were recorded, for example. The situation on the border threatens to get out of the authorities' control.

At the same time, ultrarightists in the United States have started advancing the thesis more and more frequently that the regime in Mexico, "weakened by the domestic crisis" and "bogged down in bureaucracy," is not in a position to resist either the attempts at internal destabilization or the pressure of "external forces" hostile to America.

The mass media in the United States has unleashed a "psychological attack" against Mexico in recent years, intimidating the average American with "the danger next door." "An uprising in Mexico," according to THE WASHINGTON POST, "would have predictable consequences for the world economy, control of inflation, the role of the dollar, for NATO, for the ability of the United States to project its military might to the rest of the world and, as a consequence of this, for the Soviet Union. It could change the entire history of the world for the next generation."³ Open propaganda for intervention in southern Mexico to "protect" the oilfields has been started in the American press. These plans were "justified" by "internationalization" of the Mexican economy and the sharply increasing economic interdependence of the two countries. Speculating on the difficulties connected with repayment of the foreign debt, American rightists have even suggested that Mexico "cede" Baja California in exchange for liquidation of its financial obligations. With references to the need to combat drug trafficking, an attempt has been made to obtain the right to move special subunits of the U. S. Armed Forces, including aircraft, across the border, which could have far-reaching consequences for Mexican sovereignty.

The work of the so-called "Helms Committee," which organized hearings in Congress on the subject "The sharply deteriorating situation in Mexico and its consequences for the national security of the United States" became the culmination of the anti-Mexican campaign by the right-wing forces. In particular, it was stated in them that because of Mexico's traditional one-party government, it is a "socialized" country; in this connection, it was suggested that Mexico hold "free elections," denationalize the banks, and continue to put state enterprises in the hands of private owners. Helms called on the U.S. Government to discontinue aid to Mexico until it "makes progress" in "liberalizing" the economic and political life of this country. Taking advantage of the press reports on falsification of local elections by the ruling party in the states of Chihuahua, Durango and Oaxaca, he came out in principle for a repudiation of "tacit agreement with the PRI," which had thus far not been ostracized so openly by U.S. officials.

All this, as well as frequent mention in the American press of the PAN, which is zealously exposing "the PRI dictatorship," evidently has put the Mexican leaders on

their guard in earnest. Mexican reaction to the "Helms hearings" followed immediately: a protest note was sent to Washington, and the mass media unanimously labeled this step as an attempt to discredit the government for the constructive role it is playing in Central America. "Everything attests that the U.S. Government is prepared to increase financial pressure to bring about changes in Mexico's political structure," a Mexican observer noted.⁴ The world press did not remain aloof from the events, either. "The United States is politicizing the Mexican debt," wrote London's *THE FINANCIAL TIMES*. "The talks being proposed are not limited to purely financial matters."⁵

Under these conditions, the removal (in June 1986) of J. Silva (Herzog), the Mexican secretary of finance and public credit and an active supporter of the policy of privatization, was considered an attempt to maintain a firm position to demonstrate the ruling circles' unwillingness to make further concessions to its partner in accordance with the model. For its part, the Reagan administration obviously is not yet ready to repudiate the old, time-tested model of bilateral relations. But the "Helms hearings" may be considered a "trial balloon" and a "feeler" in the course of the search for acceptable solutions.

This was confirmed by a meeting of the two countries' presidents in Washington on 13 and 14 August 1986, which was called upon from the very beginning "to reduce the heat of passions" engendered by the "Helms committee," which did not particularly examine the critical problems related to settlement of the Central American crisis and the election results in a number of Mexican states.⁶ Reagan's statement on loans scheduled for Mexico, and the agreements reached by the sides to revitalize bilateral trade cooperation, intensify the coordinated struggle against drug smuggling, and remove U.S. restrictions on imported Mexican tuna made it possible for observers to assess the results of the meeting as "positive." However, the problems which the meeting "left aside" provide no grounds to believe that it managed to put an end to the process of increasing American-Mexican contradictions. Although it was acknowledged at the meeting that the immigration problems "will begin to decrease to the extent that the Mexican economy is normalized,"⁷ the abstract nature of such wording is obvious. First of all, the periods of time for Mexico to recover from the economic crisis which has continued since the early 1980's were quite indefinite, and secondly, the very methods for "normalization" proposed by the United States and international financial organizations, which provide for further privatization of the economy, reduction of state expenditures, and in the final analysis, increased unemployment, are capable only of intensifying the wave of immigration many times over. Thus, the problems associated with illegal immigration are not being removed; they are being driven in more deeply.

By attempting to tightly seal off the channel of illegal immigration, Washington obviously hopes to acquire an

additional lever for pressure on Mexico. The forthcoming deportation of immigrants (according to various estimates, from 1 to 3 million after 1 January 1982) will worsen the difficult economic situation in this country as it is. Aside from the need to find additional work places for the returnees—according to Mexican specialists' estimates no less than 1 million of them will be required every year, Mexico will also be deprived of an annual influx of foreign exchange amounting to several million dollars.

It is becoming more and more clear that the ultraconservative approach to Mexico is not simply a "splash of emotions," but a well-thought-out tactic to supplement the U.S. administration's pragmatic policy as a whole toward this Latin American country. This was confirmed in the speech by the U.S. representative to the United Nations, V. Walters, in April 1987, in which he virtually repeated Helms.

The sharply intensified contradictions between Mexico and the United States are lending themselves less and less to settlement within the framework of a dialogue "at the highest levels." Being objective in nature on the whole because of the inevitable inequality between the center and the periphery of the capitalist system, they are being substantially intensified by the U.S. effort to take advantage of favorable market conditions to establish new "rules of the game" with Mexico, chiefly in the plan to narrow the autonomy of this country's ruling circles in both foreign and domestic policy. However, such a trend in the development of American-Mexican relations is capable of leading only to their aggravation in the final analysis, which is dangerous not only for both countries, but for international security as well.

Footnotes

1. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Paris, 28 October 1986.
2. EL HERALDO, Barranquilla, 15 November 1986.
3. THE WASHINGTON POST, 3 March 1986.
4. EL FINANCIERO, Mexico, 28 May 1986.
5. THE FINANCIAL TIMES, London, 11 June 1986.
6. See VISION, Mexico, Vol 67, No 5, 1986, p 34.
7. Ibid.

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Peruvian President Alan Garcia Perez Interviewed
*18070059d Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in
Russian No 12, Dec 87 pp 39-48*

[Interview with Peruvian President Alan Garcia Perez:
"Our Strategy Is Continental Integration"; interviewer,
time and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] Mr President, the Soviet press recently published an article by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev which mentions the necessity of establishing a system of universal security and a system of economic security as an important and integral element of it. With this objective, the USSR proposes that an agreement be reached to reduce developing countries' payments on their foreign debt and that additional exemptions be provided for the least developed ones. How do you assess this approach?

[Answer] Mr. Gorbachev's viewpoint coincides with what we have been saying for 2 years now: the foreign debt is not an economic problem, but a political one. The entire populations of poorly developed countries cannot be sacrificed to Western banks. He have every right to restrict payment to a specific percentage of export income or to pay off the debt with our products.

As Mr. Gorbachev correctly points out, the problem of security is closely linked with the entire world economy. In the final analysis, it is precisely the economy that advances political systems, and the deeper the gulf between the two parts of the world—the industrially developed part and the part that is becoming poorer and poorer—the greater the danger not only of nuclear war, but of social violence, and holding this process in check is the most difficult of all.

We, the poor countries of the Western world, realize more clearly than before that our relationships with world capital are becoming more and more unproductive. When Lenin gave a definition for imperialism, the wealthy countries were able to simply seize outlying areas that possessed raw material resources. Later the large monopolies appeared, they built their enterprises on our lands and taught us to consume commodities which we knew nothing about. Now we are in debt to capitalism and it collects interest, making us even poorer. In recent years, the "Big Seven" which have taken possession of the world market and the most advanced technology are shunning the Third World more and more, not realizing that the greater the isolation, the more restricted the market will be for their technology and goods. Consequently, the "Big Seven" countries are turning out to be in deep crisis themselves.

Mr Gorbachev is absolutely right in calling on the wealthy countries to agree to reduce payments on the foreign debt. And this is not a question of philanthropy here. After all, only in this way will the world economy become revitalized and the world market be expanded. By building relations with us on the basis of fairness, in

the prices for our raw material in particular, the wealthy countries could take a new leap forward in economic development. Until capitalism finds a political solution to this problem on a global scale, it will not get out of its deep crisis. I fully agree that the foreign debt problem has a great deal in common with the problem of universal security.

[Question] Two years of your presidency have passed already. From what was planned, what have you succeeded in carrying out, and what has not been accomplished? What do you intend to do in the remaining 3 years?

[Answer] We have managed to carry out part of each one of the measures planned, but we have not been able to do everything we wanted. I believe that Peru has become a more independent country internationally. We are maintaining a firm position with respect to the foreign debt: payments are limited to a specific sum, and no international formulas in the area of economic policy are hanging over us. In particular, we are not following the recommendations of the IMF, since we believe that a state should manage its own economy itself. Our "heretical" economic policy has yielded positive results over the past 2 years: we have achieved more than in the past 25 years, during which the country dutifully followed IMF recommendations. Some changes have been made in the economic system. We do not collect interest on nearly one-third of the agricultural credits, and we are gradually abolishing the concept of interest itself as typically capitalist. We cannot allow a large group of bankers to make use of credit and financial levers to apply pressure on the major national enterprises. Steps have been undertaken to nationalize the banks for this purpose.

Although the state has not yet become the spokesman for the interests of the majority of the population, it is now striving to reach the peasant communities and the Indian settlements where there are millions of Peruvians who do not know what convenience and prosperity are. The state must also reach the city unemployed, organize this social group, and enter into direct contact with it. But an even more important task is to achieve Latin American unity, to make Peru a leader in integrating the continent. History has shown that one country can stand against the entire capitalist system, but it is obvious that it is easier to achieve success if we advance as a united front.

The USSR and the United States are country-continent. Latin America is divided into many comparatively weak states. We will continue our integration efforts for the next 3 years and pass along this concept as a testament for future governments.

[Question] What is your government's foreign policy strategy?

[Answer] There cannot be a purely foreign policy in our interdependent world. We are not an island, but even if we were, we would still know how people live in other countries with the help of television. The leaders of states today are only leaders of a large or a small portion of mankind, and this makes us equal. The problems facing Peru, primarily poverty and backwardness and its subordinate position, are part of common Latin American problems; consequently, they must be resolved on a continental scale.

As far as our strategy is concerned, it consists in particular of bringing about the integration of Latin America, not by bureaucratic methods which do not yield positive results, but with the help of effective solutions. Today we are faced with a common problem—the foreign debt. It affects every country to a different degree. The peoples demand that their governments find a solution: we can see this in the examples of Argentina and Brazil. I believe that such common problems can contribute to the unification of Latin America.

We must not forget that countries in the region are part of the Third World, a major branch of the nonaligned movement. There are problems which are of equal concern to Latin Americans and the peoples of other countries, including the Soviet people. I refer to the problems of security and peaceful coexistence. In short, our strategy is to achieve independence through unity and to make our wishes known through unity. After all, the problem of nuclear disarmament, let us say, concerns not only those who have atom bombs, but primarily those who do not have them.

[Question] How do you assess the situation in Central America?

[Answer] I am an optimist in politics. I believe that better times are coming for this subregion. In my view, the situation there is better today than it was 3 or 4 years ago. There was a real threat of direct military intervention by the United States quite recently. We now see that it is gradually relaxing. The meeting of five Central American presidents has continued the path toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict. So I view the situation optimistically, and I am confident that imperialist intervention and a fratricidal war in this region is becoming less and less of a threat with each day.

[Question] What may be expected from the meeting of Latin American presidents which you are initiating?

[Answer] The meeting will become an event of great political significance, in my view. First of all, because we have never met before, with the possible exception of those cases when we were called together by the President of the United States. I consider this fact disgraceful: after all, we represent an entire continent. The United States has another language and a different culture and way of doing things. In a word, it is a different world.

We, the Latin American countries, are one unit, divided artificially 150 years ago. For this reason, the fact that we are getting together on our own initiative is significant.

Secondly, we are faced with the same problems. Our democracy needs to be reinforced not only "from within," but on a continental scale. Let us take the foreign debt. We will be able to resolve this problem successfully if we act together, but not alone. There have already been presidents in Latin America who tried to find an independent solution. But while one suggested a certain alternative, the rest tried to come to an agreement with the IMF. I suggested: let us unite and speak as a united front. This will be a historic event, and it will demonstrate our unity.

I look with envy at the scope and the state organization of the Soviet Union, which can serve as an example for the peoples of Latin America. We do not have the developed technology and the nuclear potential that the great powers have, of course, but we can be proud of our cultural and historical heritage. Simon Bolivar, the great Liberator of Latin America, convened a meeting of the presidents of the continent's first five republics 160 years ago in Panama. We would also like to convene in Panama. But because of this country's domestic problems, we have not managed to do this. And I recalled that the departing delegates 150 years ago agreed to meet a year later in Mexico. For this reason, I suggested to Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid: let us eight Latin American presidents meet with you and thereby continue the policy aimed at achieving unity. I expect a great deal from the forthcoming meeting with respect to resolution of the foreign debt problem and expansion of trade.

[Question] What contribution could the nonaligned movement introduce to make the world nuclear-free?

[Answer] The only thing we have at our disposal is the force of conviction. But it is sometimes greater than the force of an atomic bomb. The one who possesses the bomb can annihilate his enemy, but the one who believes in something can persuade an enemy. This is also the essence of the vast difference between the weak ones who have an atomic bomb and the strong ones who have faith.

I think the nonaligned movement should speak in behalf of the majority of people in the world and act with the force of conviction. As I stated previously, I admire Gandhi, and I also admire Saint Paul, Christ's disciple, because he spread Christianity beyond the borders of Galilee and in Greece and Rome, and was able to persuade the Rome of that day.

If only we could knock at the door of the Rome of today, Washington, until the conscience of the American people is heard! I believe in the Americans, a people of democratic traditions who built their economy with tremendous efforts over the centuries. I believe that the drawbacks characteristic of the U.S. administration are not

characteristic of the American people. But there is a gulf between us. If we could set forth our views and our moral credo like Saint Paul—after all, we have no other weapon—this could be a very important role for the nonaligned movement. We want to bring influence to bear on the peoples' conscience. This is our only weapon, but it is also the strongest one.

[Question] What do you think of the restructuring under way in the USSR?

[Answer] I think highly of Mr. Gorbachev's efforts, and I believe his activity in the international arena and in domestic policy attests to the formation of a powerful movement emerging in the country. This now involves restructuring and democratization which are necessary to carry out, in our opinion, and carry out on the basis of justice and planning. Gorbachev has made important efforts toward normalization of the international situation; we think very highly of this and we are closely following events. The USSR has raised the banner of democracy after snatching it from the hands of other world leaders.

[Question] What is your opinion on Peruvian-Soviet bilateral relations and on the prospects for mutually advantageous cooperation?

[Answer] First of all, I thank you for the interview. Permit me to send a greeting to the Soviet people. Peru is a small country on the other side of the globe. We are striving to unify Latin America and urge it forward in order to speak as one nation, like the Soviet people, who paid dearly for the right to call themselves a great power. We think highly of its tremendous efforts: after all, the USSR has been turned into a powerful leading state because of this. It was precisely the Soviet people that bore all the burdens of the war, losing millions. To us, the Soviet Union is like an antifascist emblem, and this brings us closer spiritually and politically.

I would like our cooperation to include the cultural, political, and economic areas along with military cooperation. Certain American specialists on Peru feel that we are tied too closely with the Soviet Union on arms policy. I believe that this is not the most important aspect. We would like to diversify and develop our ties.

I would remind you again that the moral victor will not be the one that gains the upper hand in the rivalry between the two great powers, but the one that sits at the negotiating table with the Third World first. For its part, Peru is always ready to make its contribution to peaceful coexistence and to the establishment of fair conditions for the development of all mankind.

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Book on 20th Century Latin American Revolutions Reviewed

18070059e Moscow *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* in Russian No 12, Dec 87 pp 109-112

[Review by A. V. Shestopal of book "Latinskaya Amerika: Revolyutsii XX veka" [Latin America: Revolutions of the 20th Century] by Yu. N. Korolev and M. F. Kudachkin, Moscow, Political Literature Publishing House, 1986, 350 pages]

[Text] The monograph by Yu. N. Korolev and M. F. Kudachkin is of particular interest today, in the 70th anniversary year of the Great October Revolution, when we seek to comprehend the international revolutionary experience of our century. About 40 important social developments equal or nearly equal in importance to a key social phenomenon in history—revolution—have been carried out in Latin America in the 20th century. Among them are those which have assumed truly international significance, having absorbed the experience of many other revolutions. The Mexican revolution (1910-1917), the Guatemalan revolution (1944-1954), and the Bolivian revolution (1952) may be included among them. The revolutions in Cuba (1959), Chile (1970-1973) and Nicaragua (1979) occupy a special place in the continent's history. The monograph's authors correctly emphasize that the revolutions were reflected in fundamental changes in the world and a new distribution of forces in the international arena. These revolutions revealed the content and nature of social reforms, and the Cuban revolution proved that a transition to socialism in Latin America is possible in principle.

The Mexican revolution took place at the juncture of modern and contemporary history. A number of features displayed in it brought it closer to the European bourgeois revolutions of the 19th century. At the same time, the monograph notes, the Mexican revolution was turned around into an era of imperialism. For this reason, it is characterized by an overall anti-imperialist orientation, which is inconceivable without rejecting the most offensive forms and manifestations of capitalist relationships (p 88).

The revolutionary trend developed and became firmly established in the workers and trade union movement in Latin American countries under the influence of the Great October Revolution. It involved persons of various persuasions: syndicalists and anarchists and democrats and Catholics. Communist parties were established in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Chile and Cuba. The struggle assumed an anti-imperialist orientation which was more and more clearly expressed. The intelligentsia, the progressive segment of the armed forces, and urban petty bourgeois strata joined it more and more frequently along with the the working class and the peasantry. At the same time, as pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4 of the monograph, the course of this struggle was profoundly contradictory and dramatic. Latin American societies were not ready yet for far-reaching social

changes. Participation by the working masses in the revolutionary movements made them popular and democratic in nature. But they were led by the bourgeoisie. For this reason, the revolutions of that period did not culminate with the necessary social and economic reforms, which led to a great many compromises with foreign capital and to the slow, deformed development of local capitalist structures.

The defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan in World War II and the development of cooperation among the socialist states revitalized the struggle of the forces against imperialism and local oligarchy in Latin American countries. Chapters 5 and 6 point out that the Bolivian and Guatemalan revolutions were the most striking events in this period. The Cuban revolution summed up the postwar attempts by the Latin American bourgeoisie to subordinate the revolutionary process to their interests and demonstrated a realistic alternative for social development.

The revolution in Cuba proved that while the bourgeoisie has basically used up the revolutionary potential assigned to it by history, the working class, united with strata of working people, can lead a democratic and anti-imperialist revolution along the path of socialism. In analyzing the international lessons of the Cuban revolution, the authors note its historic nature and the absence of opportunism in it, and single out three decisive factors which enabled it not only to stand its ground but to resolve the problems associated with the building of a new society as well. The first of these factors is the class and political maturity of the working class and all the working people and their readiness to defend the revolutionary motherland with every means, and their firm desire to build their own future. The second factor is the presence of a revolutionary vanguard capable of resolving the most difficult problems of revolutionary struggle, as well as democratic and socialist construction, and capable of stirring the people to defend their historic achievements. And the third factor is the support of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community, which Cuba has been aware of in all periods of its revolutionary history (p 202).

The experience in social creativity of each national revolution, even if it suffered defeat, is never wasted; it leaves a deep imprint in the national consciousness. It is utilized by the international workers, democratic and national liberation movements. The timeliness of the lessons of national unity, mainly with respect to the rallying of democratic and anti-imperialist circles, is being demonstrated now throughout the course of the political struggle in Chile, which is steadily increasing.

The Chilean revolution demonstrated the possibility of a peaceful way for the democratic-revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces, led by the proletariat, to win power. But the importance of its experience and lessons are not limited to this. There was revolutionary creativity by the masses, with revolutionary action on a scale adequate for

certain stages of the revolution which proved to be inadequate in other stages. As Yu. N. Korolev and M. F. Kudachkin convincingly prove, U.S. imperialism brought about the coup in Chile not by direct aggression, but through the hands of local reaction, which unquestionably indicates that internal factors were one of the main causes of the revolution's defeat.

Unlike the Peruvian experience, where revolutionary democrats from the armed forces who were unable to rally the masses, mainly the organized proletariat, around them remained in isolation, the popular movement in Chile, led by the working class, was unable to keep the democratic sector of the armed forces in its camp and to defend it from the reaction, and it was unable to make an expeditious transition from peaceful means of struggle to military and political means (pp 115-124).

The anti-imperialist democratic revolution in Nicaragua continues to be developed in depth, vividly confirming the conclusions of the international workers and communist movement on the increasing role of the external factor. Indeed, events in past decades, including the Cuban revolution, did not involve the unity and unanimity among the forces of socialism and the proletarian and national liberation movement that existed in the deciding months and days for the Nicaraguan people. Moreover, circles and governments which are characterized as moderate- progressive and democratic centrist with respect to various social and historical "levels" have actively associated themselves with the basic revolutionary currents of the present in support for Nicaragua (p 297). The experience of Nicaragua thus provides material for studying opportunities for wide-scale unification of the forces of democracy, social progress and peace.

The authors point out throughout the work that events in Latin American countries attest to the increasing role of the working class in the destinies of their societies. The proletariat is conducting a struggle and filling its historical role as the creator of a new society under diverse conditions: the building of socialism in Cuba, the struggle against imperialism and capitalism in the continent's most developed capitalist states, and completion of national liberation in countries which are still in colonial and semicolonial dependence. And the proletariat is advancing at the head of the movement for social liberation everywhere with the course of history itself.

At present, as the monograph correctly stresses, the development of new areas of class struggle which are emerging in connection with the transnationalization of Latin American economies is assuming importance. The strengthening of the imperialist yoke and the political and social authoritarianism which are typical of the TNK's [transnational corporations] are resulting in an increase in democratic and anti-imperialist trends in the popular struggle. Amidst the aggravated crisis of capitalism and the intensive searches for solutions to combat

the crisis which are accompanied by conflicts in the "upper strata," considerable opportunities are opened for an offensive by revolutionary forces.

When a new edition of the book is printed, it is hoped that the authors will devote more attention to the democratic revolutionary regimes in Peru and Bolivia. It would also be expedient to review the U.S. armed intervention in the Dominican Republic, which blocked the way for revolutionary development of this country, as well as the progress of liberation processes in a number of countries in the Caribbean basin.

In summing up, we should note that the monograph by Yu. N. Korolev and M. F. Kudachkin is an important contribution in generalizing experience in the development of the revolutionary liberation movement in Latin America in the 20th century. Events on the continent and the development and intensification of the struggle against imperialism and oligarchy for democracy and social progress vividly attest to the extension of the revolutionary process, the beginning of which is linked with the overall crisis of capitalism and the victory of the Great October Revolution.

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UD/332

Journal Examines 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

18070078b [Editorial Report] Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian carries in issue No 1, January 1988 on pages 40-80 an article entitled "Caribbean Crisis— The Most Important Lesson of History." The editorial comment preceding the discussion says the following: "Never yet during the postwar years has the world been so close to nuclear catastrophe, as it was 25 years ago. It is necessary to go back to history to learn the right lessons. This is even more essential today when, on its own initiative, the USSR is making its way along the road to new thinking in international affairs. Representatives from the three countries that were directly involved in the conflict— Raymond Garthoff (USA), Rafael Hernandez (Cuba), and S. A. Mikoyan (USSR)— - discuss the causes and consequences of the Caribbean crisis on the pages of this journal."

UD/332

PRAVDA Notes SRV's 'Constructive Position' On Spratly Island Dispute

18070086 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian carries on 18 March 1988 on page 7 a 200-word article by A. Sergeyev, entitled "A Positive Initiative" commenting on the tense situation surrounding island territories in the South China Sea and noting Vietnam's positive proposals aimed at resolving differences through political means. Sergeyev notes that "the Spratly Islands have long been a subject of dispute between a number of Asian states. In recent days, armed conflict has even taken place between ships of China and Vietnam in the archipelago zone." Sergeyev refers to a diplomatic note sent on 17 March from the SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conveying Vietnam's readiness to enter into negotiations with China to settle disputed border problems, including the question of the Spratly Islands. "The diplomatic initiative of the SRV once again is evidence of good will from the Vietnamese side in striving for a settlement of questions at the negotiating table, in the interests of peace in the region." Sergeyev notes that "the constructive position Vietnam has taken finds support in the Soviet Union."

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New Melanesian Group Praised As Bar To U.S. Military Presence

18070081 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian carries on 20 March 1988 on p 5 a 2200-word article by Oleg Skalkin entitled "Voices From the Ocean" about

the establishment of a "Leading Group of Melanesian States" consisting of Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. Skalkin notes that the three states intend to collaborate on questions of economic and technical development, to unite efforts for preservation and development of their cultures, and above all, to strengthen national independence. "This obviously does not suit those who use the separation of the Pacific countries, their dependence on foreign aid, and their isolation, not only from the outside world but also from each other, to derive benefit and profit through neocolonial means — shamelessly robbing, as is done by American tuna fishing corporations, whose boats poach in the waters of many Pacific countries." Skalkin goes on to contrast Soviet and American military positions in the Pacific Ocean. "At a time when the Soviet Union is striving not to permit military-political confrontation in the Pacific Ocean and constructively coming forward in this direction, the United States is fanning the arms race in every way possible, including nuclear. The United States is implementing wide-scale measures for the build-up of armed forces, placing carriers of nuclear weapons, and creating military bases and strategic bridgeheads." Skalkin notes "The Melanesian initiative is siding with the antimilitaristic, antinuclear trend, which is all the more noticeably and persistently influencing the international climate in the Pacific Ocean. The initiative is developing the cause of a nuclear-free zone, declared in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean by countries of the South Pacific Forum."

UD/332

New Indian Consul in Tashkent Interviewed

18070080 [Editorial Report] Tashkent EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 12, December 1987 on page 37 carries a 500-word article entitled "Course — To Widening Cooperation" describing cooperation between the Uzbek SSR and the Republic of India. The editorial comment preceding the article notes that India has opened a consulate in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Soviet correspondent N. Shamukhamedov met with the Indian consul general in Tashkent, Yogendra Kumar, and asked him to describe briefly the status of and prospects for developing ties between India and Uzbekistan. The Indian Consul recalls that "the heads of our states signed in Moscow in 1985 documents providing for a significant increase in the trade turnover between our countries up to 1990. A large part of the increase will come to Uzbekistan, to your market." He further notes that "a large number of private firms in India show a striking interest in changes in your country. The structure of trade is changing. New forms of cooperation with your republic are being proposed. Joint projects for Indian firms to construct hotels in the cities of Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, and others have been accepted for implementation."

UD/332

Praise for Indian Communists Work Against Punjab Separatists

18070077 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian carries on 25 February 1988 on page 4 a 1400-word article by V. Korovikov, entitled "Courage Against Fanaticism" about contributions that Indian communists are making in the struggle against "terrorists" and "separatists". Korovikov notes that, "from the very beginning, the Communist Party of India has come out against the idea of 'Khalistan,' consistently standing for the principle of separation between religion and politics." According to Korovikov, "the struggle against fanatic-extremists is difficult and dangerous. Ten communists have already given their lives for this just cause." Among those killed was Darshan Singh, who had warned that "the path on which Punjab separatists are moving will lead to disintegration of the country and to enmity between Sikhs and Hindus." Korovikov recalls that, "last year, the Communist Party of India conducted a mass political campaign in Punjab, exposing supporters of 'Khalistan' and terrorists. Communists held open mass meetings throughout Punjab villages." Korovikov quotes the newspaper INDIAN EXPRESS: "The campaign of mass contacts between the Communist Party of India and the population, involving 1200 villages, and the reaction of village residents show that, perhaps, the struggle with terrorism can be won. The situation in Punjab requires that all patriotic parties follow the Indian Communist Party's example and work vigorously both independently and together with other parties." Korovikov also notes that the Executive Committee of

the Indian Communist Party adopted a special resolution on Punjab. "The resolution points to the necessity of summoning the participation of all parties to work out a national approach to the Punjab crisis and to take timely measures for a political solution." UD/332

Nepalese Foreign Minister On Relations With USSR, Asian Security

18070082 [Editorial report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian carries on 27 March 1988 on page 4 a 1200-word interview by an unnamed IZVESTIYA correspondent in Kathmandu with Nepalese Foreign Minister S. K. Upadhyaya under the headline "Nepal: Contribution To Asian Security" [date not given]. Minister Upadhyaya is quoted as saying that Nepal's status as a self-proclaimed "zone of peace responds not only to the interests for establishing security in Asia, but also to the goals of disarmament in general." He goes on to emphasize the need to resolve regional conflicts through peaceful means: "In our view, large states should play an important role in this. When we speak about guaranteeing Asian security, we have in mind above all such countries as the Soviet Union, China, and India." Minister Upadhyaya offers the following assessment of Nepalese-Soviet relations: "It is possible to characterize Nepalese-Soviet relations as good. But today this is obviously not enough. I think that we need to strive to make them excellent. Soviet leader M. S. Gorbachev's 1986 program speech in Vladivostok on problems of Asian security was met with enthusiasm in Nepal. The new leadership of the Soviet Union has a broad view of problems. This is characterized by new thinking leading to a cardinal transformation, not only in the life of Soviet society, but also in the international arena. I am deeply convinced that all the conditions for developing and strengthening relations between Nepal and the Soviet Union are present. The Nepalese people are sincerely grateful for the help which the Soviet Union has rendered in creating our national industry and infrastructure. Past experience shows that there are many areas in which our countries are able to cooperate fruitfully."

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Tamil Tigers Said To Obstruct India-Sri Lanka Agreement

18070087 [Editorial report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian carries on 4 April 1988 on page 6 a 400-word article by O. Kitsenko entitled "'Tigers' on the Warpath" about the various forces complicating realization of the India-Sri Lanka agreement. Kitsenko claims that "As formerly, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are playing the principal destabilizing role." He quotes an official representative from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs as claiming that "This organization is conducting a campaign of physical violence against the Tamils. The 'Tigers' are attempting to terrorize those, whose interests they allegedly are 'defending.' They want the Tamils to refuse to support measures of the civilian administration

and elements of the Indian armed forces, directed at normalizing the situation." Kitsenko quotes the Indian minister of external affairs, Natwar Singh: "India patiently waits for the time when the LTTE rejects violence in favor of a democratic path for resolving problems. Up until now, the 'Tigers' have attempted to establish control over one-third of the country's territory by force of arms, through eliminating rival political

parties." Kitsenko concludes the article saying, "In short, the process of political settlement in Sri Lanka depends, to a large degree, on the position which the LTTE occupies."

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